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1 Introduction
We study information asymmetry in the equity market around operational risk announcements in U.S.
public financial firms. Better disclosure practices of financial information improve liquidity, provide a
monitoring role over the behavior of senior management, and help maintain the trust of stakeholders—
shareholders, supervisors, governments, and depositors. Diamond (1985) argued that releasing infor-
mation makes shareholders better-off by maximizing their welfare. Recent U.S. regulatory initiatives
that address disclosure include the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 that broadens the range of
permissible banking activities and adds provisions regarding information-sharing, the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 that deals with security and privacy of data in the
healthcare industry, the Basel II Capital Accord of 2001 that mandates regulatory capital for risks and
their market disclosure, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 that mandates disclosures of internal
control weaknesses in compliance with the SEC’s disclosure laws,1 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 that
calls for stricter reporting and disclosure requirements in the financial industry, along with a mortgage
reform and consumer protection rules.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) mandates the measurement and management
of operational risk, defined as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people,
systems, or from external events. Operational risk may arise from diverse causes, such as unauthorized
transactions, business disruptions due to technology and software failures, flawed financial models and
products, poor business practices, natural disasters, employment issues and discrimination, and execution
and delivery failures. Along with credit, market, and liquidity risks, operational risk has been acknowl-
edged as a major source of material failures in financial firms. Trading errors and excessive risk-taking
that led to a $6.2 billion trading fiasco for JPMorgan Chase in 2012 (“London Whale”), Bernard Madoff’s
$50 billion Ponzi scheme in 2008, a $7.2 billion trading loss at Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale in 2008, and the colossal
losses from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, are some recent examples. Chernobai, Jorion, and
Yu (2011) showed that operational risk events are manifestations of internal control weaknesses and can
be traced to improper business practices, weak economy, poor governance, and excessive risk-taking of
executives. Wang and Hsu (2013) also found that stronger governance helps reduce occurrence of opera-
tional risk in financial firms. Basel II Capital Accord’s Pillar III calls for more stringent market discipline
and transparency via public disclosures of operational risk:
“The Committee aims to encourage market discipline by developing a set of disclosure re-
quirements which will allow market participants to assess key pieces of information on the
scope of application, capital, risk exposures, risk assessment processes, and hence the capital
adequacy of the institution. In principle, banks’ disclosures should be consistent with how
senior management and the board of directors assess and manage the risks of the bank.”
(BCBS, 2006b, p. 226)
1SOX’s relevant sections are Section 302 (Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports) and Section 404 (Management
Assessment of Internal Controls).
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To date, much of academic work on operational risk has been focused in the area of Pillar I of
the Capital Accord that deals with the quantification of the regulatory risk capital. Recent studies
of the equity market reaction to operational risk public announcements (Perry and de Fontnouvelle,
2005; Cummins, Lewis, and Wei, 2006; Gillet, Hu¨bner, and Plunus, 2010) found that such news spur
large drops in market prices, in particular for internal fraud events. Cummins, Lewis, and Wei (2006)
showed that the cumulative abnormal returns are over 1% for banks and over 3% for insurers, and
Gillet, Hu¨bner, and Plunus (2010) found the cumulative abnormal returns to exceed 4%. Motivated by
recent regulatory advancements and prior research on operational risk, our question is: if operational risk
announcements are informative releases, then do such releases affect information asymmetry between
informed and uninformed traders in the equity market, and how?
Information asymmetry arises from differential information between informed and non-informed traders.
In classical information asymmetry models (e.g., Copeland and Galai, 1983; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985),
informed traders (e.g., large shareholders, financial analysts, creditors, and managers at competing firms)
possess superior price-relevant firm-specific information not available to non-informed traders, or can ex-
tract private information from public releases. They profit from trading on private information (not yet)
available to uninformed traders (e.g., market makers and discretionary liquidity traders). Market makers
bear losses incurred due to the informational disadvantage when they make public the prices at which
they commit to sell or buy; however, they offset them by imposing a bid-ask spread—wide enough to
recoup the losses but tight enough to maintain fair liquidity demand. Hence, bid-ask spreads widen when
market makers perceive higher levels of information asymmetry. Market makers may also reduce the
quoted depth, thus adversely affecting liquidity.
Information asymmetry has been studied predominantly in the context of corporate earnings an-
nouncements. Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997), Stoll (2000), Venkataraman (2001), Chung, Elder,
and Kim (2010), Bhattacharya, Desai, and Venkataraman (2012), and Bhattacharya, Ecker, Olsson, and
Schipper (2012) found increased levels of information asymmetry around such announcements.2 Kim
and Verrecchia (1994), Lee, Mucklow, and Ready (1993), Krinsky and Lee (1996), and Aﬄeck-Graves,
Callahan, and Chipalkatti (2002) showed that market makers act to increased information asymmetry
around earnings releases by temporarily widening the bid-ask spread. By doing so, they attempt to
protect themselves against informed investors who may be responsible for the high volumes and volatility
in trading (Lee, Mucklow, and Ready, 1993; Easley and O’Hara, 1992; Harris and Raviv, 1993).
Earnings announcements are scheduled releases. For scheduled announcements, elevated trading prior
to the release is primarily due to informed traders who trade to profit from information leakage, but may
also be enhanced by uninformed traders who try to gamble on the upcoming news. In contrast, op-
erational risk announcements are unscheduled and almost always constitute bad surprises to investors.
When an event is unscheduled, any excess trading prior to the announcement is accounted for by informed
2Recent studies of corporate earnings restatement announcements (Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz, 2004; Anderson
and Yohn, 2002) also found that information asymmetry is increased around such news releases.
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traders. Literature on unscheduled announcements is sparse. Chae (2005) studied information asymme-
try around the announcements of acquisition, target, and Moody’s bond ratings changes, and Brooks,
Patel, and Su (2003) investigated CEO deaths, plane crashes, and plant explosions. These studies found
that information asymmetry increases in general, but their data consisted of announcements of many
diverse causes without focusing on a single one. Our study differs from these by focusing on a single
well-defined class of unscheduled announcements—operational risk events. In addition to studying infor-
mation asymmetry around the first press cutting of such events, we also study it around the settlement
announcements (that are more anticipated).
“Banks’ disclosures should be consistent with how senior management and the board of directors assess
and manage the risks of the bank.” (BCBS, 2006b, p. 226) The quality of information disclosed by the
management is positively associated with the strength of corporate governance (Klein, 2002; Ajinkya,
Bhojraj, and Sengupta, 2005; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). Kanagaretnam, Lobo, and Whalen (2007)
found that firms with more active and independent boards and with higher insider holdings incur less
information asymmetry around quarterly earnings releases. Prior research showed operational risk to be
inversely related to the strength of corporate governance (Chernobai, Jorion, and Yu, 2011; Wang and
Hsu, 2013). Establishments of operational risk committees and Chief Operational Risk Officer positions
should reduce lower-tail risk and also promote better communication of risk to the senior management
and key stakeholders. This study examines whether better governance and risk management initiatives
improve disclosure quality and reduce information asymmetry around operational risk announcements.
Using a rich sample of 331 operational risk announcements from U.S. financial firms during 1995-
2009 and examine their trades and quotes on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ exchanges. We study
separately the first press cutting and settlement announcements. We find that information asymmetry—
measured by effective spread and price impact of trade (and their changes from the non-event period)—
significantly increases around operational risk first announcements but decreases around the settlement
announcements, particularly for internal fraud events and events related to flawed business practices.
Furthermore, firms with stronger governance (higher board independence ratio, higher equity incentives of
insiders, and higher institutional ownership) experience lower levels of information asymmetry around the
first announcements, and around settlements better governed firms see a smaller reduction in information
asymmetry, but that the effect of risk management initiatives is limited. We interpret this as evidence
of the risk management function being primarily driven by the need for regulatory compliance.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that investigates market microstructure around
operational risk announcements in financial firms. Identifying the factors affecting information asymmetry
around such events may help regulators develop policies that would ensure a transparent and liquid
securities market, which would provide investors with greater confidence in their investments. This paper
proceeds as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe our operational risk data and our measures of information
asymmetry. Section 4 develops testable research hypotheses. Section 5 describes our research design and
variables. Section 6 presents our empirical findings. Section 7 discusses liquidity. Section 8 concludes.
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2 Description of Operational Risk Announcements Data
Following Basel II, we categorize operational risk into seven main event types:
1. Internal Fraud: events intended to defraud, misappropriate property, or circumvent regulations or
company policy that involve at least one internal party. Examples: unauthorized trading and theft.
2. External Fraud: events intended to defraud, misappropriate property, or circumvent the law per-
formed by an external party. Examples: check kiting and breach of system security.
3. Employment Practices and Workplace Safety: events inconsistent with employment, health, or
safety agreements. Examples: losses arising from employee relations, safety of the environment,
and diversity and discrimination.
4. Clients, Products, and Business Practices: events due to failures to comply with a professional
obligation to clients and improper design of a product. Examples: improper business and market
practices, product flaws, and faulty advisory activities.
5. Damage to Physical Assets: events leading to a damage or loss of physical assets either from natural
disasters or man-made disasters. Examples: fires, floods, hurricanes, vandalism, and terrorism.
6. Business Disruption and System Failures: events causing disruption of business or system failures.
Examples: hardware failures, software bugs, and computer viruses.
7. Execution, Delivery, and Process Management: events due to failed transaction processing or pro-
cess management occurring from relations with trade counterparties and vendors. Examples: losses
from faulty transaction execution and maintenance, customer intake and documentation.
The source of our operational risk announcements data is the Algo Financial Institutions Risk Sce-
nario Trends (Algo FIRST) database, marketed by IBM.3 FIRST’s primary purpose is to assist financial
institutions to understand, identify, and manage their operational risk through a comprehensive collec-
tion (over 13,000 entries) of operational risk case studies. Nearly three quarters of the recorded events
are from financial institutions and more than half are from the U.S. The information is collected from
public sources, such as the media, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) press releases, and
court orders. As such, all information is readily available to investors and provides an ideal basis for
our research. Details on each announcement include firm name, dates, event type, loss amount, claimant
name, geographical location, and a detailed narrative.4
For most operational risk events, announcements are made over a period of time, each announcement
marking a distinct development of the event. Gillet, Hu¨bner, and Plunus (2010) studied the market
reaction around the three timings: (1) the first press cutting date marking the first mentioning of the
event, (2) the recognition date when the company announces the event, and (3) the settlement date,
on which the settlement occurs. But the first two timings often coincide. Hence, we use two timings
3IBM acquired the FIRST database after its acquisition of Algorithmics, Inc. in October 2011.
4The database was previously used in Wang and Hsu (2013), Chernobai, Jorion, and Yu (2011), Gillet, Hu¨bner, and
Plunus (2010), Cummins, Lewis, and Wei (2006), Rosenberg and Schuermann (2006), and Perry and de Fontnouvelle (2005).
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instead: the first is the first press cutting date and the second is the announcement of settlement. In
the cases when the announcement of an upcoming settlement is made prior to the actual settlement
date, we use the former date for the settlement date. Whenever the settlement announcement is the first
announcement available on a particular event, we retain no date for the first announcement. As such,
while for the majority of events in our sample we have both the first announcement and settlement dates,
for some of the more recent ones only the first announcement information is available, and for another
few we have only the settlements.
We focus on operational risk announcements in publicly traded U.S. financial firms. We further
restrict our data to events with losses that are material in nature, in excess of $10 million.5 Constrained
by availability of the governance data, we narrow our sample period to 1995-2009. We then exclude events
with unclear first press cutting date and settlement date, with unclear firm name, that are random
in nature (those due to terrorism or natural disasters in the category Damage to Physical Assets),
with unavailable TAQ data, or with missing market or governance data. We then check the dates for
consistency with the LexisNexis and Factiva business news databases. We also excluded one event in
firm with stock price under $1 and another event that had less than 5 trades per day. Our final sample
contains 331 events. The sample selection procedure is summarized in Table 1.
Figure 1 illustrates the time series of operational risk events’ announcements. The frequency increased
over the sample period. A pronounced jump is evident around 2002, which coincides with the passage of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Another jump occurs around 2008 and is likely a consequence of the financial
crisis. Figure 2 illustrates average cumulative abnormal equity returns (CARs) for the event window [-
20,+10]. CARs are negative around first announcements and positive around settlement announcements,
consistent with earlier empirical findings (Gillet, Hu¨bner, and Plunus, 2010; Cummins, Lewis, and Wei,
2006; Perry and de Fontnouvelle, 2005). CARs are -1.64% over the event window [-3,+3] and -7.83%
over the event window [-20,+10] around first announcements. For settlement announcements, these are
1.57% and 5.73%, respectively. These results are statistically significant at 1% level.
Table 2 provides additional description of our data. From Panel A, the majority of the announcements
are of Clients, Products, and Business Practices (CPBP) type (57.7% of the first and 68.8% of the
settlement announcements), followed by internal fraud (15.8% and 12.8%, respectively) and external fraud
(13.3% and 7%, respectively). Only about 30% of the first and 53% of the settlement announcements are
self-disclosed; the majority are disclosed by a third party, such as a regulatory authority (e.g., the SEC
and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)), shareholder, client, or court, and are not
accompanied by a statement by the firms. This is particularly evident for the first announcements in the
CPBP category, in which events are typically linked to failed business strategies that firms are reluctant
5For many announcements, the information on the loss amount is absent from the initial announcement but is either
estimated later or accumulates over time as a result of fines and payments to third parties. Also, sometimes the initial
announcement contains an estimate of loss rather than the exact amount. In such cases, we treat the estimate as an actual
loss amount. Our sample contains the events with loss amount known to be in excess of $10 million at the present time (as
of 2014), regardless of the actual timing at which the loss amount became known.
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to reveal to the public voluntarily; notably, for these events the pattern reverses around settlements.
For internal fraud the distribution is fairly uniform, perhaps because firms believe that their disclosure
is less detrimental to the firm’s public status. The fact that the majority of the first announcements
are involuntary in nature alleviates concerns over self-selection bias. Panel A also informs about events
that disclose the loss amount. For over half of our events, the loss information is contained in the initial
announcement, and for others it is missing (it is often released with a delay by weeks, months, or even
years). In contrast, almost all (98%) press releases of settlements include the loss amount. Panel B of
Table 2 reports the distribution of events by the two-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code.
Roughly one third of events (32.9%) occurred in banks, another third in securities and commodity brokers
(33.2%), 23% in insurance, and less than 12% are in non-depository institutions and real estate firms.
3 Measures of Information Asymmetry
Bid-ask spread is commonly decomposed into three components, each reflecting particular costs to the
market maker (Copeland and Galai, 1983; Ho and Stoll, 1981, 1983; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Glosten,
1987; Glosten and Harris, 1988; Grossman and Miller, 1988; Hasbrouck, 1988; Stoll, 1978, 1989). Order
processing costs compensate market makers for the time they take to stay able to match buy and sell
orders and perform the paperwork involved in the transaction. Inventory holding costs compensate
market makers for holding less than fully diversified portfolios. Adverse selection costs compensate
market makers for undertaking the risk of dealing with more informed traders who may possess superior
information or who may be able to process information in a faster and cost-efficient manner; this risk is
known as information risk. The adverse selection component is the one linked to information asymmetry
and reflects how market makers act as uninformed traders and estimate their information risk associated
with trading alongside informed traders.6
Our first measure of information asymmetry is percentage effective spread (Lee, 1993; Huang and
Stoll, 1996). Quoted bid-ask spread does not necessarily capture trading costs for transactions occurring
outside the posted quotes, because an order whose size exceeds the quoted quantity at the best prices may
be completed at a price outside the bid-ask spread (Lee, 1993; Huang and Stoll, 1996; and Bhattacharya,
Desai, and Venkataraman, 2012). Therefore, effective spread is a better measure of trading costs as it
accounts for trades both inside and outside the quotes. Unlike quoted spread, effective spread is estimated
using ex post trading costs of executed trades. In essence, effective spread calculates the deviation of the
execution price from the true underlying value of the security and is computed as:
Percentage Effective Spread it = 2×Dit ×
Price it − Midpoint it
Midpoint it
× 100, (1)
where Priceit is the transaction price at time t for security i and Midpoint it is the midpoint of the quoted
6Studies using quoted spreads as a measure of information asymmetry include Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and
Milgrom (1985), Kim and Verrecchia (1994), Krinsky and Lee (1996), and Aﬄeck-Graves, Callahan, and Chipalkatti (2002).
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ask and bid prices immediately prior to the transaction. The variable Dit is 1 for market buy orders and
-1 for sell orders. The multiplication by 2 accounts for the round trip cost of transactions. Following
Bhattacharya, Ecker, Olsson, and Schipper (2012), Bhattacharya, Desai, and Venkataraman (2012),
Chung, Elder, and Kim (2010), and Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997), for the midpoint we use the
midpoint of the last quote immediately prior to the trade. Effective spread can be viewed as an estimate
of the execution cost paid by traders and the gross revenue earned by liquidity providers, and captures
both the non-informational costs (inventory costs, order processing costs, and possibly market maker
rents) and informational (adverse selection) costs of liquidity provision. We use two versions of effective
spread. The first one is in the level form as defined in Equation (1), and the second one is the change
in percentage effective spread as in Bhattacharya, Desai, and Venkataraman (2012) and Aﬄeck-Graves,
Callahan, and Chipalkatti (2002), which is the difference between daily average percentage effective spread
for each of the days in the event window and the average percentage effective spread during the non-event
period. This difference should be positive during periods of heightened information asymmetry.
Our second measure of information asymmetry is percentage price impact of trade proposed by Huang
and Stoll (1996). It estimates the adverse selection risk perceived by liquidity providers based on the price
adjustments observed subsequent to a transaction. For anticipated good (bad) news, the market maker
expects the informed traders to submit buy (sell) orders. However, non-informed traders are equally likely
to submit buy and sell orders, creating order flow imbalance. For an undervalued security this imbalance
will tend to be positive and for an overvalued security negative. Market makers react to such order
flow imbalances by widening spreads and adjusting quotes upward following buy orders and downward
following sell orders. Hence, these price adjustments capture market makers’ assessment of the proportion
and the extent of information asymmetry between informed and liquidity traders (Bhattacharya, Desai,
and Venkataraman, 2012; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). The percentage price impact is computed as:
Percentage Price Impact of Trade it = 2×Dit ×
Price i,t+τ − Midpoint it
Midpoint it
× 100, (2)
where Pricei,t+τ is the first transaction price τ minutes after time t and Midpoint it is the midpoint of
the quoted ask and bid prices immediately prior to time t. Literature considers various time horizons
to estimate an asset’s post-trade economic value—from τ = 5 minutes to τ = 30 minutes. However,
Werner (2004) reports that spread measures obtained in large samples are relatively insensitive to the
choice of the post-trade benchmark. In our study, we use τ = 30 minutes, which has been the choice
in Bhattacharya, Desai, and Venkataraman (2012), Bhattacharya, Ecker, Olsson, and Schipper (2012),
Venkataraman (2001), and Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997). In addition to the level form of this
variable, as in Bhattacharya, Desai, and Venkataraman (2012), we also use the change in percentage
price impact of trade which is the difference between percentage price impact of trade for each of the
days in the event window and the average percentage price impact of trade during the non-event period.
The effective spread and price impact of trade have been used extensively in recent literature to
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quantify information asymmetry: Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997), Stoll (2000), Venkataraman (2001),
Chung, Elder, and Kim (2010), Bhattacharya, Desai, and Venkataraman (2012), and Bhattacharya,
Ecker, Olsson, and Schipper (2012). Computations of Equations (1) and (2) require categorizing trades
as seller- or buyer-initiated. Two algorithms have been proposed. In the first algorithm proposed by
Lee and Ready (1991), trades completed at prices above (below) the midpoint price are classified as buy
(sell); trades executed at the midpoint are assigned according to the “tick test” where trades at a higher
(lower) price relative to the most recent trade are classified as buys (sells). In another algorithm proposed
by Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000), trades executed at the ask (bid) quote are classified as customer
buys (sells), and the tick test is used for all other trades. Finucane (2000) showed that although the
two algorithms produce very similar results, Lee and Ready’s (1991) algorithm slightly outperforms the
second algorithm. In this paper, we estimated our models using both algorithms and the results were
practically identical. In what follows, all results use Lee and Ready’s (1991) algorithm.
4 Hypotheses Development
Higher quality disclosures reduce information asymmetry between market participants—informed and
non-informed (liquidity) traders. Kim and Verrecchia (1994) argued that disclosures about firm’s fun-
damentals, such as earnings announcements, stimulate informed judgments among traders. Informed
traders are better able to perform a superior assessment of the information and to process public disclo-
sures into private information, than market makers. In anticipation of such announcements, information
asymmetry in the market rises as investors increase their search for private information that would allow
them to profit once earnings are made public (Bhattacharya, Desai, and Venkataraman, 2012; Bhat-
tacharya, Ecker, Olsson, and Schipper, 2012; Chung, Elder, and Kim, 2010; Stoll, 2000; Fu, Kraft, and
Zhang, 2012; Brown, Hillegeist, and Lo, 2009).
Earnings announcements are scheduled. For unscheduled announcements, information asymmetry
has been documented to increase as well. Chae (2005) studied abnormal trading volume around unsched-
uled announcements of acquisition, target, and Moody’s bond ratings changes. Brooks, Patel, and Su
(2003) studied adverse events such as a CEO death, plane crashes, and plant explosions. Both studies
documented an increase in information asymmetry. Operational risk events are similar to these types of
events. On the basis of previous empirical research, we hypothesize that operational risk first announce-
ments increase information asymmetry in the equity markets. Furthermore, because such announcements
are unanticipated by investors, we expect this increase in information asymmetry to be more pronounced
immediately following the announcement.
In turn, operational risk settlement announcements are perceived by investors as positive news (Figure
2B; Gillet, Hu¨bner, and Plunus, 2010) that have been long anticipated. Because news of an achieved
resolution agreement brings the event to a closure, we anticipate information asymmetry to decrease
around the press release. Furthermore, this decline should be more pronounced immediately following
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the announcement. We formulate our first set of hypotheses as follows.
H1a: Information asymmetry increases around operational risk first announcements, especially im-
mediately after the announcement.
H1b: Information asymmetry decreases around operational risk settlement announcements, especially
immediately after the announcement.
We investigate whether the strength of corporate governance helps explain the changes in information
asymmetry around operational risk announcements. The quality and quantity of information disclosed by
the management is positively associated with the strength of corporate governance (Klein, 2002; Ajinkya,
Bhojraj, and Sengupta, 2005; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). “Banks’ disclosures should be consistent
with how senior management and the board of directors assess and manage the risks of the bank.” (BCBS,
2006b, p. 226) We consider the effects of external and internal governance.
The Basel II Capital Accord requires that senior management and the board of directors play a central
role in operational risk management. Specifically, Pillar II mandates regular reporting of operational risk
practices to senior management and the board of directors, and regular review of risk management
systems and processes by internal and external auditors (BCBS, 2006b, pp. 149-151). Independent board
directors balance the power of executive directors sitting on the board and monitor the performance
and integrity of the senior management. They motivate the senior management to exert more effort to
provide disclosure of higher quality and to improve internal controls thus reducing agency costs between
owners and managers (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Walsh and Seward, 1990; Beasley, 1996;
Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, and Lapides, 2000; Klein, 2002; Farber, 2005). Therefore, we expect
board independence to be negatively associated with information asymmetry around operational risk
announcements—both first and settlements.
We examine the role of stock holdings by the firm’s board directors. The agency theory theorizes a
positive link between managerial ownership and disclosure quality. The extent of managerial ownership
helps align the interests of management with those of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). We
therefore hypothesize that information asymmetry is lower around operational risk announcements for
firms with higher levels of managerial stock ownership.7 We look also at the monitoring role played by
blockholders. Because of their wealth being closely linked to the performance and market valuation of
the disclosing firm, larger shareholders have stronger incentives to exert monitoring over the integrity and
efficiency of management. This alleviates agency conflicts and enhances disclosure quality (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1986; Huddart, 1993; Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner, 1994; Maug, 1998; Noe, 2002). Therefore,
7Recent empirical work frequently supports another, management entrenchment, theory that suggests a negative associ-
ation between managerial ownership and disclosure quality. The theory postulates that concentrated managerial ownership
could be counter-productive to the firm’s long-term value, as management could effectively wield external monitoring.
Strong equity incentive might cause management to focus too much on meeting certain stock price targets and maximizing
their private benefits, while paying short attention to risk management controls or even reducing disclosure levels (Ruland,
Tung, and George, 1990; Gelb, 2000; Eng and Mak, 2003; Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003) and may lead to financial
misreporting (Burns and Kedia, 2006; Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson, 2007).
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market makers are expected to shrink the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread for firms
with large stakes in stock held by institutional owners.8
We proxy for external governance by the strength of shareholder rights. Weaker shareholder rights
mean that the firm’s management is more isolated from the external market for corporate control. Re-
searchers have found a negative link between the strength of shareholder rights and the incidence of
financial misstatements (Baber, Kang, Liang, and Zhu, 2009), reporting of internal control weaknesses
(Elbannan, 2009), and operational risk exposure by financial firms (Chernobai, Jorion, and Yu, 2011).
The management in firms with weak governance would show more discretion to follow its own agenda and
would have diminished incentives to align their interests with those of shareholders. We therefore expect
firms with stronger shareholder rights to make greater attempts at providing more credible information
to investors, leading to lower information asymmetry around operational risk announcements.9
H2: Information asymmetry is lower around operational risk first and settlement announcements for
firms with stronger internal and external governance.
Strong risk management function in financial firms is necessary in order to correctly identify risks and
to prevent excessive risk-taking (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein, 2008; Stulz, 2008).
By adopting an enterprise risk management (ERM) system, companies attain a more systematic, top-
down, approach toward risk management, which includes risk assessment, quantification, financing, and
managing, and which in turn improves firm’s operational and strategic decisions, leads to more efficient
capital allocation, and increases the value of the organization (Grace, Leverty, Phillips, and Shimpi,
2014). Beasley, Pagach, and Warr (2008) and Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) found that establishing of a
Chief Risk Officer (CRO) position signals the adoption of an ERM system and the equity market reacts
positively to such news in corporate firms. Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) and Grace, Leverty, Phillips,
and Shimpi (2014) found that ERM adds value to publicly traded insurance firms by increasing the cost
and revenue efficiency. Baxter, Bedard, Hoitash, and Yezegel (2013) document increased usefulness and
reliability of accounting information for financial firms with higher quality ERM. Since disclosure is a
characteristic of a town-down risk management, transparency and quality of information regarding risk
and operational efficiency available to market participants should improve. Therefore, we conjecture the
8A counter argument can be made but is not supported by our data. In the financial industry, the principal-agent
relationship is not confined to the traditional relationship between managers and shareholders as found for industrial firms.
Frequently, managers and large shareholders of financial firms experience more severe agency conflicts with minor sharehold-
ers, tax payers, and the society as a whole (Evans and Quigley, 1995; BCBS, 2006a). In the presence of deposit insurance,
institutional investors may have incentives to undertake higher risks (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013).
As a result, they may mitigate the disclosure incentives of managers in order to extract private benefits at the detriment
of minor shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; John, Litov, and Leung, 2008; and Laeven and Levine, 2009), forcing
the management to withhold information and dilute public disclosure. They start trading on private information prior to
an announcement, thus driving up the trading volume. Market makers observe high trading volume and might suspect
undisclosed information to be possessed by blockholders and anticipate higher information risk. As a result, to protect
themselves against information risk, market makers may widen the bid-ask spread.
9Perry and de Fontnouvelle (2005) found a positive link between shareholder rights and the market reaction to operational
risk announcements. They argued that an operational risk in a firm with strong governance constitutes an unanticipated
surprise to investors, causing them to react strongly to such an announcement. Consequently, market makers might revise
their previous assessment of information risk associated with trading the stocks of such firms.
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presence of risk management initiatives to be negatively associated with information asymmetry.
While in corporate firms improvements in risk management are driven by learning from bad experience
and past losses, financial firms may have other incentives. In financial services firms risk management
practices are significantly more mature than in corporate firms (Beasley, Branson, and Hancock, 2012;
Pagach and Warr, 2011). Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) document an across-the-board increase in risk
management initiatives in bank holding companies after 1999, and argue that banks frequently appoint
risk managers merely to satisfy regulatory compliance, without giving them real power. Minton, Taillard,
and Williamson (2014) report that in 2001, 4-5% of all banks have a risk committee and CRO, and by
2007 13% of firms had a risk committee and 19% had the CRO position.10
Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) identify two channels through which risk management function may de-
velop in financial firms. In the “business model channel” banks have an aggressive risk culture and
choose to take higher risks coupled with weaker risk management functions. Financial firms are in the
business of taking risks and they may optimally choose to undertake higher risks while at the same
time tightening risk controls in addition to increasing hedging. In the “hedging channel” banks adopt
a more aggressive stance on risk management when they experience financial distress. Beasley, Pagach,
and Warr (2008) found no significant association between the equity market reaction and appointments
of senior risk executives in financial firms. Minton, Taillard, and Williamson (2014) found that bank
holding companies with a greater percentage of financial experts among independent directors engage in
higher risk-taking activities because they have better understanding of more complex investments. Fur-
thermore, they found that in stable times, the presence of external financial experts on the firm’s board is
associated with higher risk taking. Baxter, Bedard, Hoitash, and Yezegel (2013) too found no association
of ERM quality with equity returns during the financial crisis (September 2008 through February 2009)
in US financial services firms. In light of these considerations, we anticipate a dampened effect of risk
management on information asymmetry.
We use several proxies for operational risk management: the presence of an Operational Risk Officer
and his tenure; the existence of an operational risk committee and the number of years since its estab-
lishment; the presence of a Chief Risk Officer and his tenure; the existence of an enterprise-wide risk
committee and the number of years since its establishment. Additionally, to capture the effectiveness of
the board’s risk oversight, we keep track if a firm’s Chairman serves on the risk management committee.
The above considerations motivate the following hypothesis.
H3: Information asymmetry is lower around operational risk first and settlement announcements for
firms with stronger risk management functions.
10For comparison, in our sample of firms with operational risk announcements, 55% of firms have an enterprise-wide
risk committee and around 45% have a CRO position. These figures are substantial, given that they represent average
proportions during the 1995-2009 period. However, our sample is biased toward larger firms and also risk management
variable are significantly more prevalent in firms with above-median assets size. In past literature, firm size and business
complexity have been shown to be positively associated with adoptions of an ERM system or appointments of a senior risk
executive (Minton, Taillard, and Williamson, 2014; Gordon, Loeb, and Tseng, 2009; Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011).
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Operational risk events come from diverse causes, and while some types, such as internal fraud and
flawed business practices, are truly idiosyncratic and thus, arguably, more controllable from within the
firm, others, such as external fraud, are externally originated (Chernobai, Jorion, and Yu, 2011). One
would expect the announcements of internally inflicted events to represent the most significant amount
of novel information revealed to the public. Perry and de Fontnouvelle (2005) and Gillet, Hu¨bner, and
Plunus (2010) found that internal fraud announcements cause the highest decline in the market value
of loss firms.11 Gillet, Hu¨bner, and Plunus (2010) also document a significant drop in equity values for
events of type Clients, Products, and Business Practices. Cummins, Lewis, and Wei (2006) documented
material leakage of information prior to operational risk announcements. Informed traders who possess
superior knowledge about internal operations are likely to begin trading on such private information in
the days leading to the announcement, thus increasing the information gap between informed and non-
informed traders. We therefore hypothesize that information asymmetry is increased around operational
risk first announcements especially for internal events. At the same time, because firms are more likely
to implement controls in place to remediate such events and to make such actions publicly known, we
anticipate no to little change in information asymmetry around the settlements. We thus hypothesize:
H4a: Increase in information asymmetry around operational risk first announcements is higher for
internal fraud events and events related to flawed business practices.
H4b: Information asymmetry around operational risk settlement announcements is lower for internal
fraud events and events related to flawed business practices.
The information content of an announcement may also shed light on how information asymmetry
might change. The first characteristic is the disclosure source. We differentiate between events that are
disclosed by the firm itself and events disclosed by a third party, such as a regulator, court, a customer,
or a client firm. The benefits of self-disclosure of internal control deficiencies allow the management
to “get in front of the issues” (Karr, 2005) and to signal to the market that the firm is free of more
serious problems such as material weaknesses or a heightened likelihood of future earnings restatements
(Martinek, 2005; Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Kinney, 2007). The positive message sent to the market
serves as an assurance for the investors that the firm holds the quality of its financial information to a high
standard. Therefore, one would anticipate a decrease in information asymmetry for self-disclosed events.
In contrast, when an event is disclosed only by a third party, this raises red flags regarding potential
serious problems with internal controls that the firm’s management is trying to withhold. Third-party
disclosure may deepen investors’ concerns over the stability of the firm’s future cash flows. Consequently,
information asymmetry around third-party announcements should rise.12
11Perry and de Fontnouvelle (2005) found that internal fraud events cause market value drop that roughly 2 times exceeds
the loss percentage (i.e., the loss amount divided by the market capitalization). Gillet, Hu¨bner, and Plunus (2010) found
that for operational risk announcements, trading volume begins to rise starting around day 4 prior to the press cutting date
and the abnormal volume reaches roughly 25% on day -2, almost 50% on day 0, and 68% on day +1.
12A counter-argument could be made, but is not supported by our data. Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Kinney (2007)
studied voluntary disclosures of internal control deficiencies prior to SOX and found that the market shows no significance
reaction to such announcements. Prior to SOX firms were likely selective in the information that they chose to disclose and
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Our second characteristic of an announcement is the information about the material impact that is
disclosed. We consider quantifiable impact—the dollar amount of the loss. Gillet, Hu¨bner, and Plunus
(2010) found the negative equity market reaction to operational risk announcements to be stronger when
the loss amount is unknown. Hirschey, Palmrose, and Scholz (2005) showed that the magnitude of a
negative impact can be explained by the degree to which firms attempt to hide the extent of losses. When
a loss amount is unknown at the first announcement, investors believe that important information about
operational risk is intentionally left undisclosed, and uncertainty regarding the financial consequences for
the firm rises. This should translate to greater information asymmetry. We believe this to be of relevance
only for the first announcements because nearly all settlements incur a financial charge to the institution
(see Table 2, Panel A). The preceding discussion motivates our last hypothesis:
H5: Information asymmetry is lower around operational risk announcements with greater information
content—that are self-disclosed and that contain information on the loss impact. The second effect is
relevant only for first announcements.
5 Research Design
5.1 Variables
We use our two proxies for information asymmetry—effective spread and price impact of trade—in level
form (EFFECTIVE SPREAD and PRICE IMPACT ) along with their differences from the non-event
period (∆ EFFECTIVE SPREAD and ∆ PRICE IMPACT ). The intra-day data on trades and quotes is
from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database. Following convention, we exclude quotes posted on regional
exchanges. We use all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ quotes posted between 9:30 AM and 4:00 PM EST
for each trading day. As in Bessembinder (1999), we eliminate trades marked as exchange acquisitions
or involving nonstandard settlement.13 We treat potential outliers by removing extreme trades involving
price changes between two consecutive trades of over 50%. We also drop all quotes with non-positive ask
or bid price, quotes associated with trading halts or designated order imbalances, and quotes that are
non-firm.14 Following convention, our event window spans 7 trading days, starting 3 trading days prior
and ending three trading days after each announcement. As in Bhattacharya, Desai, and Venkataraman
(2012), our non-event period spans the two weeks (10 trading days) commencing four calendar weeks
prior to the announcement date and is used as a benchmark in constructing the ∆-form variables.15
We use four variables related to corporate governance. We proxy for stronger boards using board
independence (BOARD INDEPENDENCE ), computed as the ratio of fully independent directors on the
voluntarily disclosed only what they believed to have no long-term impact on the firm. Hence, self-disclosed operational risk
announcements may actually deepen investors’ concern that there is more in stock to what has been revealed.
13TAQ database Sale Condition codes A, D, D, N, O, R, and Z.
14TAQ database Quote Condition codes 4, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 27, and 28.
15Earlier studies have considered a non-event period of two trading days starting four weeks prior to the announcement
date. An advantage of using a wider window is strengthening the validity of our benchmark quotes and trades. We tried
using a two-day period for the non-event period but the results were weaker than using 10 trading days.
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board. We measure equity incentives of board directors by their ownership of company’s shares (INSIDER
OWNERSHIP), computed as the ratio of common shares owned by the insiders to all common shares
outstanding. Because this variable is severely right-skewed, we winsorize it at 95%. We also proxy for
the effects of ownership concentration by the fraction of common shares owned by outside blockholders
(BLOCK OWNERSHIP) holding over 5% of firm’s shares. Data on institutional ownership were collected
from the Blockholders database for 1996-2001 and for the period 2001-2009 hand-collected from proxy
statements. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) governance index (GINDEX ) is the number of anti-
takeover charter provisions and laws, ranging from 0 to 24. Higher index values mean better insulation
from the market for corporate control, and thus weaker shareholder rights. The data are from RiskMetrics.
The nine risk management variables were hand-collected from 10-K and proxy filings. Five are dummy
variables—OPRISK OFFICER, OPRISK COMMITTEE, CHIEF RISK OFFICER, RISK COMMIT-
TEE, and CHAIR ON RC. The other four are the number of years each risk management function has
been in place—OPRISK OFFICER YEARS, OPRISK COMMITTEE YEARS, CHIEF RISK OFFICER
YEARS, and RISK COMMITTEE YEARS. Table 7 provides further details on the risk positions and
committees in our sample. Similarly to Ellul and Yerramilli (2013), we construct RISK MANAGEMENT
SCORE by taking the first principal component of our nine risk management variables. Principal com-
ponent analysis performs a singular value decomposition of the correlation matrix of the nine variables.
We extracted the single factor that is the eigenvector in the decomposition with the highest eigenvalue.
By constructing a risk management score in this way, the risk series that move more together are given
more weight in the overall score, eliminating the need to subjectively judge on the relative importance of
each risk factor. Higher values of the score suggest better ERM.16
We use several variables related to announcements characteristics. The first two are a dummy variable
for self-disclosed events (DISCLOSED BY FIRM ) and a dummy variable that flags whether the opera-
tional loss amount was revealed on the press cutting date (LOSS ANNOUNCED). We also distinguish
between event types using Basel-defined event type classification described in Section 2. As explained ear-
lier, we exclude all announcements related to Damage to Physical Assets due to their random nature. We
include three dummy variables to capture the effects of internal fraud (INTERNAL FRAUD), events of
type Clients, Products, and Business Practices (CLIENTS, PRODUCTS, & BUSINESS PRACTICES ),
and external fraud (EXTERNAL FRAUD), and hold all other events as a reference group.
Our models include several control variables. NUMBER OF ANALYSTS is the number of analysts
following the firm in the latest earnings per share forecast, collected from Thomson Reuters’ Institutional
Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database. For firms with lower analyst coverage, information is
transmitted more slowly across the investing public (Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000) and investors are
less certain about the firm’s future performance (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Abarbanell, Lanen, and
16Baxter, Bedard, Hoitash, and Yezegel (2013) use a different, analyst-based, measure of overall ERM quality. They use
S&P ERM quality rating that is based on S&P analysts’ evaluations (weak, adequate, strong, or excellent) of a financial
firm’s ERM, gathered from the 404 ERM disclosures in the S&P Ratings Direct database. The data covers selected firms
among banks and insurance companies.
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Verrecchia, 1995; Barron, Kim, Lim, and Stevens, 1998). Hence, market makers might anticipate higher
information risk around operational risk announcements for firms with lower analyst coverage. In support
of this view, Atiase and Bamber (1994) and Kanagaretnam, Lobo, and Whalen (2005) document higher
abnormal bid-ask spread around corporate earnings announcements for firms that are less widely followed.
Drawing from past research on information asymmetry, we include firm size (FIRM SIZE ) as a control,
computed as the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets at the end of the previous quarter. Firms’ total
assets were extracted from Compustat. We also control for leverage (LEVERAGE ). Empirical studies
suggest that there may be an increase in volatility in the stock market prior to an earnings announcement
because of speculative trades. As we discussed earlier, for operational risk announcements, any jump in
volatility should suggest trades by informed investors trying to profit from private information. We thus
include the variable VOLATILITY measured as the standard deviation of daily equity returns during
the year ending one month prior to the announcement. We expect a positive coefficient because greater
riskiness is translated into greater uncertainty regarding the future of the firm that may be known only to
informed traders. While VOLATILITY captures idiosyncratic risk of the firm, we also include a measure
of systematic risk, BETA, that is estimated as the beta factor estimated from single-factor CAPM model;
we use 255 days of daily equity returns and the value-weighted market index. Market data are obtained
from the University of Chicago’s Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
We control for stock performance using PRICE which is the trading price on the previous trading
day for each day in the event window. We believe that market makers anticipate larger discrepancy in
opinions between informed and liquidity traders for announcements that bring bigger surprises to the
market, i.e., those accompanied by the greater drops in equity values. Easley and O’Hara (1992) showed
that market makers widen the spreads in response to unusually high trading volumes. We thus include
the logarithm of the trading volume (VOLUME ) on the previous trading day for each event day as a
control. The logarithm of the number of common shares outstanding (NUMBER OF SHARES ) is used
as an additional control variable in our model for liquidity determination.
Another control variable is DECIMAL that equals 1 for all events after January 29, 2001 and 0
otherwise. On this date, NYSE and AMEX moved from fractional pricing to decimal pricing, and
NASDAQ mirrored the change on April 9, 2001. Bessembinder (2003) found that the reductions in tick
size have led to a significant narrowing in spreads; in particular, trades executed outside the quotes
saw the largest improvements in executions costs, thus making effective spread an event more efficient
measure of information asymmetry than quoted spread.17 We also include dummy variables to distinguish
between banks (BANKS ) and insurance firms (INSURERS ) from other financial firms, to account for
possible industry differences in information asymmetry. In one of our robustness checks, we also include
year fixed effects. Variables’ description and data sources are summarized in Appendix.
17Bhattacharya, Desai, and Venkataraman (2012) eliminated all earnings announcements in 2001 to avoid problems due
to having announcement and non-announcement periods in different tick size regimes. None of the events in our sample had
event window and non-event period belong to the two different tick size regimes.
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5.2 Econometric Framework
Our data are organized as a balanced cross-sectional time-series panel. Each panel represents an individual
event spanning seven trading days. Such research design was used in Lee, Mucklow, and Ready (1993),
Libby, Mathieu, and Robb (2002), Verrecchia and Weber (2006), Werner (2004), Kanagaretnam, Lobo,
and Whalen (2005, 2007), and Yohn (1998).18 The dependent variable is a measure of information
asymmetry—effective spread or price impact of trade—and the independent variables consist of firm-
specific governance and risk management covariates, event-specific announcement characteristics, and
control variables. For each firm-event i and trading day t of the event window, we estimate the following
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model separately for the first and settlement announcements:
(∆) Information Asymmetry it = α+
J∑
j=1
γjGovernance it,j +
R∑
r=1
ψrRisk Management it,r
+
K∑
k=1
βkAnnouncement Charactistics it,k +
M∑
m=1
θmControl Variables it,m + εit, (3)
where on the left hand side Information Asymmetry is EFFECTIVE SPREAD or PRICE IMPACT in
level or change (∆) form. On the right hand side, term α is the intercept, term Governance is the
set of governance variables (BOARD INDEPENDENCE, INSIDER OWNERSHIP, BLOCK OWNER-
SHIP, and GINDEX ), term Risk Management is either the RISK MANAGEMENT SCORE or the set
of individual risk management variables (described in Section 5.1), term Announcement Characteristics
is the set of variables related to announcement characteristics (DISCLOSED BY FIRM, LOSS AN-
NOUNCED, INTERNAL FRAUD, EXTERNAL FRAUD, and CLIENTS, PRODUCTS, & BUSINESS
PRACTICES ), term Control Variables is comprised of control variables (NUMBER OF ANALYSTS
FIRM SIZE, VOLATILITY, LEVERAGE, BETA, (∆)PRICE, (∆)VOLUME, and dummy variables
DECIMAL, BANKS, and INSURERS ), and the term ε is the residual term. We account for poten-
tial heteroscedasticity by using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.
We estimate Equation (3) using announcement period [-3,+3]19 but later differentiate between pre-
and post-announcement periods by estimating the models for [-3,-1] and [0,+3] separately (Lee, Mucklow,
and Ready, 1993; Libby, Mathieu, and Robb, 2002; Werner, 2004; Yohn, 1998). In the pre-announcement
periods, information asymmetry measures the speed with which traders process the private information
that may have leaked prior to each operational risk announcement. In the post-announcement periods,
they capture the efficiency with which traders process the private information that has been disclosed.
Over the full announcement period, information asymmetry reflects the net effect of the two.
18Other papers such as Aﬄeck-Graves, Callahan, and Chipalkatti (2002), Chae (2005), Eleswarapu, Thompson, and
Venkataraman (2004), and Krinsky and Lee (1996) used a cross-sectional research design with one observation per event.
19In a robustness check omitted for brevity we tried [-1,+1] but obtained qualitatively similar results.
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6 Empirical Results
6.1 Univariate Results
Figure 3 illustrates effective spread and price impact of trade in the window surrounding the first and
settlement announcement dates. Left column presents these variables in their level form, and right column
presents their changes from the non-event period. Information asymmetry in the level form is positive
on the interval, as expected, with a notable spike at day 0 with only a slow downward trend after the
announcement for first announcements; for settlements, the highest levels of information asymmetry are
on day -3. These patterns are more pronounced for price impact of trade and for the abnormal changes
in the two variables. This is consistent with the view that effective spread is a noisier measure of the
adverse selection component of information asymmetry, than price impact of trade.
We also distinguish between three versions of post-trade benchmark τ in the computation of price
impact of trade (see Equation (2))—τ = 30, 15, and 5 minutes—depicted in Figures 3e and 3f. Around
first announcements, the level of price impact is the highest immediately after a trade (τ = 5 minutes),
while for the change in price impact of trade the highest value is for τ = 30 minutes. A 30 minute
horizon includes revisions of quotes after a longer interval of time and is likely to better capture the
market makers’ full adjustment of their quotes in response to abnormal sell or buy order flow. The 30
minutes horizon has been a common choice in literature (e.g., Bhattacharya, Desai, and Venkataraman,
2012; Bhattacharya, Ecker, Olsson, and Schipper, 2012; Venkataraman, 2001; and Bessembinder and
Kaufman, 1997).20 All our subsequent empirical results will focus on the 30 minute interval.
Table 3 summarizes sample descriptive statistics of our explanatory variables. The average and
median G-Index values are 9, the average ratio of independent board members is 72.3% around first
announcements (and is 74.4% around settlements) which is similar to the median value, just under 5% of
firm shares are held by insiders and roughly 7% by institutional stockholders on average. A typical firm
in our sample has 17 to 18 analysts following. An average firm size is $228.7bln (exp(12.34)) suggesting
that our sample is biased toward large firms perhaps because larger firms are more under the media
radar. We do not see any notable skewness in our variables, and quantile-quantile plots revealed only
a slight deviation from normality for most of our variables, thus mitigating concerns that our empirical
findings may be driven by outliers in the data.
Table 4 reports on the average effective spread and price impact of trade for different types of events
and two sub-periods, pre-announcement [-3,-1] and post-announcement [0,+3], in level form (Panel A) and
in abnormal change form (Panel B), along with mean difference tests for different sub-samples according
to our key explanatory variables’ median values (Panel C). The results in Panel A reveal interesting
patterns of information asymmetry around the announcements. As expected, information asymmetry (in
level form) is statistically significant (at 1% level) in all instances. The level of information asymmetry
tends to increase in the second sub-period around first announcements, while the opposite is observed
20Huang and Stoll (1996) report that results are robust to the choice of horizon from 5 minutes to 30 minutes.
17
around the settlement announcements. These results are supported in Panel B that shows the changes
in information asymmetry from the non-event period. We also note a striking difference in the levels of
information asymmetry by event type. Across all cases, the level of information asymmetry is the highest
around the first announcements of Clients, Products, and Business Practices events and second or third
highest for internal fraud events. For the same events, there is a significant drop in price impact of trade
from non-event period around the settlements for the former type of events, and no notable drop for the
latter type perhaps because financial firms take serious measures to remediate their business practices
after announcements of such failures and make their actions public, leaving little information that is
available only to the informed traders. All in all, our results lend preliminary support to our hypotheses
H1a, H1b, and H4 that predicted an increase in information asymmetry around first announcements and
a decrease around settlement announcements, especially for internally originated events.
Panel C of Table 4 provides preliminary insight into the associations between information asymmetry,
governance and risk management, and event characteristics beyond event type, as per our hypotheses
H2, H3, and H5. With regard to the strength of internal and external governance, the univariate results
are mixed. For the level-form information asymmetry measures, the results for the first announcements
consistent with our predictions are for GINDEX, DISCLOSED BY FIRM, and LOSS ANNOUNCED.
For the information asymmetry measures in δ-form, the only expected result is for BOARD INDEPEN-
DENCE. As for the settlement announcements, because information asymmetry drops around settlement
announcements (as was seen in Panel B of Table 4 and Figure 3), we expect firms with high ratios of
board independence and insider ownership, high risk management scores, and events with loss amount
disclosed in the settlement announcement to be associated with smaller drops in information asymmetry;
Table 4 Panel C supports the aforementioned expectations only for the level form information asymmetry
measures. All in all, this table partially supports our hypotheses.
We also examined Pearson’s pairwise correlations between our variables; full table with results is
omitted for brevity. Insider ownership appears to be strongly negatively associated (-0.33) with board
independence (perhaps because firms with low independence ratios compensate for the weak internal
governance by equity incentives for the executives), with number of analysts (-0.28), and with firm size (-
0.33). Firm size is also strongly positively correlated with the number of analysts following (0.36) because
larger firms tend to be followed by a greater number of analysts. Firm size is positively correlated with
the risk management score (0.49), which is expected based on our earlier discussion in Section 4. Apart
from these, we do not see much problems with multicollinearity amongst our explanatory variables.
Additionally, the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) in our subsequent econometric models range from 1.03
to 3.48 per variable with an average VIF per model between 1.89 and 2.23 that are well within acceptable
ranges (under 10), eliminating concerns over multicollinearity.
We must caution against overinterpreting the above results because they are univariate in nature and
do not control for the impact of other important variables in our model. In what follows, we proceed to
the multivariate analysis of information asymmetry around operational risk announcements.
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6.2 Multivariate Results
The results of our models (Equation (2)) are presented in Table 5. For each measure of information
asymmetry—effective spread and price impact of trade—we use two versions of the dependent variable,
in its level and change form. As such, we have four models for the first announcements and four models
for the settlement announcements. The reported results use event window t = [−3,+3].
With regard to internal and external governance, our findings support hypothesis H2. For the first
announcements, the coefficient of BOARD INDEPENDENCE is negative and significant at 1% level for
all four model specifications. To better see the economic significance of the result, an increase in this
variable from its first quartile to its third quartile (63.64% and 82.35%, respectively, from Table 3) results
in a predicted decrease in effective spread by 0.40% (18.72%×0.0212) and a decrease in ∆ -effective spread
from non-event period by 0.43%. Similarly, ceteris paribus, an increase in INSIDER OWNERSHIP from
its first to its third quartile results in a predicted decrease in price impact of trade by 0.41% and a decrease
in ∆ -price impact of trade by 0.17%. With regard to institutional ownership concentration, BLOCK
OWNERSHIP enters our models with expected negative sign. All else equal, an increase in BLOCK
OWNERSHIP from its first to its third quartile is predicted to increase price impact by 0.99%, a result
statistically significant at the 1% level. GINDEX has a predicted positive coefficient (an exception is in
∆PRICE IMPACT equation where the coefficient is negative but insignificant), but which is significant
only in the level regressions. For an increase in G-Index from its first to its third quartile, a ceteris paribus
predicted increase in effective spread is 0.41% and in price impact of trade is 1.39%. These predicted
effects are per single transaction and are economically significant when extrapolated over several trading
days. Around the settlement announcements, the signs of the coefficients of these variables are reversed
(with only two exceptions), as predicted by our hypothesis H2. This suggests that, overall, the reduction
in information asymmetry is smaller for better governed firms.
With respect to risk management, we are unable to see that information asymmetry is lower around
first announcements of operational risk events in firms with more established risk management systems.
This is consistent with our discussion leading to hypothesis H3 and suggests that risk management initia-
tives in financial firms are undertaken largely to meet regulatory requirements without carrying significant
power, and their impact on the information disclosure quality is limited. The result is also consistent with
Ellul and Yerramilli’s (2013) “business model channel” for the development of risk management systems
in financial firms. According to this channel, financial firms may optimally choose to undertake high risks
while strengthening risk controls at the same time, a conjecture supported by past literature. As high
business risks are associated with greater uncertainty in the equity markets, this should also widen infor-
mation asymmetry between the informed and noninformed traders. For the settlement announcements,
the coefficient of RISK MANAGEMENT SCORE is positive and significant (as we expected) for Model
(8) (∆ price impact of trade equation) and is negative and mildly significant in the other three model
specifications, suggesting that transparency is higher for firms with more established risk management
practices around the settlements.
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We find some evidence that, around first announcements, events due to internal fraud of flawed
business practices are associated with greater levels and increases in information asymmetry. This results
holds primarily in Models (3) and (4) (i.e., level and ∆-price impact of trade equations), supporting
our hypothesis H4a. Our findings also indicate that around the settlement announcements information
asymmetry drops for these events by a lesser extent than for other types of events, as we predicted in
hypothesis H4b. This is especially pronounced for events related to business practices.
The variable DISCLOSED BY FIRM has the predicted negative, although insignificant, sign for
the first announcements only in Models (3) and (4). Evidently, both firms and investors benefit from
such announcements being informative. Around settlement announcements, the coefficient is predicted
positive and significant in three out of four models. We do not find strong evidence that when the
loss amount is contained in the initial announcement it reduces information asymmetry. However, as is
evident from Models (5)-(7), in anticipation of a settlement announcement, there is a smaller reduction
in information asymmetry around settlement announcements if the loss amount is disclosed than when
it is not disclosed, as expected. In sum, our results lend support to our hypothesis H5.
As for our control variables, the findings are mixed. FIRM SIZE, VOLATILITY, LEVERAGE, BETA,
and (∆)PRICE enter most of our models with expected signs and statistically significant coefficients. We
also find some evidence that around first announcements, information asymmetry is greater in insurance
firms than in banks or other financial firms. We also find that decimalization has a surprisingly positive
effect on information asymmetry. One possible explanation to this result is that post-decimalization
period (2001-2009) in our sample overlaps with two periods of economic downturns—early 2000s and the
credit crisis of 2008-2009. Since markets tend to exhibit greater volatility during economic recessions,
it is likely that firms are more inclined to withhold private (negative) information from the public, thus
widening the information gap between informed and non-informed traders. In a later section, we will
perform a robustness check in which we exclude the problematic period post-August 2008. Interestingly,
NUMBER OF ANALYSTS enters our regressions in Models (1)-(4) with an unexpected positive sign,
which is statistically significant in three of the four models. Eleswarapu, Thompson, and Venkataraman
(2004) note that companies may provide material information to analysts as a reward for obtaining
favorable ratings and recommendations, who in return pass this information to large clients. Such selective
disclosure leads to trading advantages of informed traders and can therefore contribute to the asymmetric
information costs faced by non-informed traders.
We briefly comment on the goodness of fit. R2 ranges from 14% to 30% in level regressions and from
4% to 8% in ∆-regressions. In market microstructure papers, it is not uncommon to see low R2 values.
For example, in Bhattacharya, Desai, and Venkataraman (2012) R2 is only around one to two percent.
Similarly, in Kanagaretnam, Lobo, and Whalen (2007), R2 is under 5%. We also compare our models
using AIC and BIC criteria.21 The preferred model is the one with lower AIC and BIC values. The
21Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is computed as AIC = 2k− 2ln(L) where k is the number of parameters estimated
and L is the likelihood value. AIC rewards goodness of fit and applies penalty for overfitting. Bayesian Information Criterion
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values of AIC and BIC coefficients generally drop when the dependent variables are taken in their change
form, suggesting a better model. Also, although R2 values are higher for level regressions, AIC and BIC
values for the same models tend to be lower than for their counterparts in the ∆-regressions.
In Table 6, we estimate our econometric models from Table 5 separately for two sub-periods of
the event window: the pre-announcement period [-3,-1] and the post-announcement period [0,+3]. As
predicted in our hypotheses, the governance effects on information asymmetry have higher absolute values
of the coefficients and are also more statistically significant in the post-announcement period, with the
exception of G-Index. A similar pattern is evident with regard to announcement characteristics. All
in all, our earlier results from Table 5 appear magnified for the post-announcement period for the first
announcements, suggesting that not only does information asymmetry increase immediately following the
announcement, but that this increase is also more strongly determined by the strength of governance and
other variables. Likewise, for the settlement announcements, we observe from Panel B of Table 6 that
the reduction in information asymmetry is moderated by stronger governance and higher information
content of the press releases during the post-announcement period.
We note that our results in Tables 5 and 6 frequently varied depending on whether the dependent
variable is taken in the level or difference form. When information asymmetry is taken in the level
form, the coefficient may capture contemporaneous effects of the governance and other variables on the
overall level of information asymmetry in the markets, and may not necessarily reflect their impact
on information asymmetry around operational risk announcements. In this sense, when the dependent
variable is in difference form (i.e., all even-numbered models in Table 5 and Models (3), (4), (7), and
(8) in Table 6), we are better able to delineate the effects of our explanatory variables on the changes
in information asymmetry around first and settlement announcements of operational risk events. In
subsequent discussions we will focus on information asymmetry in its change form.
6.3 Risk Management and Information Asymmetry
In our previous models we used an aggregate risk management score variable for the effectiveness of the
overall risk management system in a financial firm. In this section, we take a closer look at the individual
components of operational risk management programs and enterprise-wide risk management system. To
do so, we include in our models all of the nine risk management variables to examine the individual
impact of each of them on the change in information asymmetry around operational risk announcements.
We begin with describing in greater detail our risk management data.
Figure 4 illustrates the time series behavior of our firms’ adoptions of various risk management
initiatives. It was not until 1999 that the first firm in our sample established an Operational Risk
Committee and not until 2003 that the first firm appointed an Operational Risk Officer. As is summarized
in Table 7, less than 8% of our firms have an Operational Risk Officer position established at the time
of an operational risk first announcement, and this proportion increased by only around 3% by the time
(BIC) is computed as BIC = k ln(n)− 2ln(L) and accounts also for the sample size n.
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of settlement. Less than a quarter of firms have an Operational Risk Committee in place around the
first announcement, and this proportion increased by 10% by the time of settlement. With regards to
firm-wide risk committees and CROs, such initiatives began sooner. On the one hand, nearly half of
our firms have the CRO position or a risk committee. On the other hand, other firms were slow with
implementing similar risk management practices, as the proportions of firms with the CRO position or
a risk committee remained practically unchanged by the time of settlement. These descriptive statistics
echo Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) that document that even though there was an across-the-board increase
in risk management initiatives after 1999, bank holding companies with high tail risk prior to 1999 did
not experience greater increases in such initiatives than the bank holding companies with low tail risk.
Table 8 presents our multivariate results. Models (1) and (5) are replica of Models (4) and (8) from
Table 5, respectively. We add three new model specifications. In Models (2) and (6) we include vari-
ables related to operational risk management: OPRISK OFFICER, the interaction term OPRISK OF-
FICER*OPRISK OFFICER YEARS, OPRISK COMMITTEE, and OPRISK COMMITTEE*OPRISK
COMMITTEE YEARS. In Models (3) and (7) we include variables related to enterprise-wide risk man-
agement: CHIEF RISK OFFICER, the interaction term CHIEF RISK OFFICER*CHIEF RISK OF-
FICER YEARS, RISK COMMITTEE, RISK COMMITTEE*RISK COMMITTEE YEARS, and RISK
COMMITTEE*CHAIR ON RISK COMMITTEE.22 Finally, in Models (4) and (8) we combine all risk
management variables in one model.
Two results stand out. First, even after decomposing risk management score, we are unable to find
strong evidence that better risk management helps reduce information asymmetry around operational risk
first announcements. The results are more in line with our hypothesis around settlement announcements.
Second, only the coefficients of senior risk officers (OPRISK OFFICER and CHIEF RISK OFFICER)
enter our models consistently with expected signs—negative in the first announcement regressions and
positive in the settlement regressions. There appears to be no consistent pattern for the interaction
variables and risk committees-related variables. One possible explanation is that when firms hire a senior
risk officer, they bring an expert with a great amount of technical expertise (Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003;
Thiessen, Hoyt, and Merkley, 2001) and a person who is frequently an outsider,23 that results in a shift
in the risk culture within the firm. Senior risk officers are held accountable for ERM of the firm, report
directly to the CEO or CFO, and are responsible for communicating the firm’s risk profile to external
stakeholders. In contrast, risk-related committees typically constitute appointees from already existing
board members, and so the risk management (and governance) leadership within the firm is effectively
unchanged. Therefore, while senior risk officers oversee the risk identification and assessment process
more effectively, establishments of risk committees seem little more than regulatory compliance.
22We did not include an interaction term between operational risk committee and Chairman serving on the committee,
because in none of the firms in our sample was the Chairman serving on the committee.
23Thiessen, Hoyt, and Merkley (2001) report, based on a 2001 survey, that one third of all CROs were hired from outside
of the organization. According to the survey, CROs identify operational risk management as one of their key responsibilities.
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6.4 Robustness Checks
In this section, we will test the robustness of our models using a series of robustness checks. Table 9
presents the results. Panel A summarizes the results for the first announcements and Panel B for the
settlement announcements. In both panels the dependent variable is the abnormal change in price impact
of trade. We use price impact of trade rather than effective spread because it is a less noisy measure of
the adverse selection component of information asymmetry.
First, we previously used cross-section time-series panel models. Because many of our explanatory
variables remain constant over the event window, there may be insufficient time-series variation in our
explanatory variables overall. To address this concern, in our first robustness check (RC1) we use cross-
sectional average values of information asymmetry over the event window as our dependent variable.
In particular, for each event announcement, we use only one observation. The dependent variable is
the average measure of information asymmetry per transaction over the event window [-3,+3], and the
two explanatory control variables that varied on a daily basis in our earlier specification (PRICE and
VOLUME ) are similarly defined. Such research design was adopted in Eleswarapu, Thompson, and
Venkataraman (2004), Bhattacharya, Desai, and Venkataraman (2012), Krinsky and Lee (1996), Aﬄeck-
Graves, Callahan, and Chipalkatti (2002), and Chae (2005). For the first announcements (Panel A), the
number of observations drops to 188 from 1,316 and for the settlements (Panel B) it drops to 288 from
2,014. The magnitudes of the coefficients are qualitatively unchanged, but the significance dropped for
some variables. R2 increased by about 11% in Panel A and 2% in Panel B.
Second, Bessembinder (2003) showed that firms on NYSE and NASDAQ exchanges experienced sig-
nificant declines in tick size due to decimalization in 2001. In our original models we included a dummy
variable DECIMAL to account for changes in information asymmetry due to decimalization but found
an unexpected positive association. One plausible explanation is that the dummy variable overlaps with
two economic recession periods in the U.S. since 2001: April 2001-November 2001 and January 2008-June
2009.24 While the former one was short, the latter one was more prolonged and more severe. Prior re-
search has shown that stock returns become more volatile during recessions reflecting greater uncertainty
in the markets. As a result, information asymmetry may experience an overall increase in the post-2001
era, which may explain our earlier results. In this robustness check we exclude the problematic post-credit
crisis period starting August 2008, following earlier studies. Model (RC2) in Table 9 reports the results
for this robustness check. The results resemble closely our original findings but are strengthened as is
seen from the increased magnitudes of most coefficients. R-squared also improved slightly.
Third, we examine separately fraud events (RC3), events of type Clients, Products, & Business
Practices (RC4), and all other events (RC5). As is seen from Panel A in Table 9, institutional stockholders
provide an incentive to financial firms to disclose higher quality information regarding Clients, Products,
& Business Practices type events that are closely linked to firms’ business practices, but not fraud or
24Source: the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/USREC.
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other events. However, price impact of trade is most likely to decline when firms disclose fraud events.
Then, around settlement announcements, firms with more independent boards and with boards with high
insider ownership are the ones experiencing the lowest drops in adverse selection for internal fraud and
business practices-related events, because such governance structures equip firms with better incentives
to disclose high quality information to all market participants.
In the fourth robustness check (RC6), we include year fixed effects to account for any omitted macroe-
conomic variables that may change over the sample period. Most of the year dummy variables came out
insignificant (coefficients are omitted for brevity). Other results remain robust for the most part and are
economically unchanged.
Fifth, some of our results may be tainted by operational risk announcements that were made as part of
scheduled earnings announcement, restatements, or reported in SEC filings. To address this concern, we
carry out robustness check (RC7), in which we drop 21 such first announcements and 13 such settlement
announcements and re-estimate our main model. The results are qualitatively the same.
In the sixth, final robustness check, we redefined our RISK MANAGEMENT SCORE variable. In-
stead of performing a principal component decomposition of the correlation matrix of the risk factors,
we created an additive version of the risk management score by giving a score of one for the presence of
each of the following operational risk and broader firm-wide risk management initiatives: existence of the
Operational Risk Officer position (OPRISK OFFICER), existence of the Operational Risk Committee
(OPRISK COMMITTEE ), existence of Chief Risk Officer position (CHIEF RISK OFFICER), existence
of a risk committee (RISK COMMITTEE ), and the Chairman of the board serving on the risk committee
(RISK COMMITTEE*CHAIR ON RISK COMMITTEE ). The results are depicted in Model (RC8) in
Table 9. The coefficients and their significance levels remain robust to this model specification.
7 Market Liquidity and Bid-Ask Spread
Information asymmetry around operational risk announcements may affect liquidity. Past studies have
used two measures of stock market liquidity: quoted depth and trading volume. Gillet, Hu¨bner, and
Plunus (2010) documented that abnormal trading volume increases by 68% following operational risk
announcements in U.S. financial firms. Chae (2005) compared liquidity for scheduled and unscheduled
news announcements. He showed that informed traders begin trading the stock more actively prior to
an announcement, while uninformed discretionary liquidity traders are unwilling to trade prior to the
announcement because price sensitivity to order flow is high. In his empirical results, trading volume
decreases by over 15% prior to scheduled earnings announcements but increases for unscheduled an-
nouncements. In our sample, abnormal change in trading volume is positive around first announcements
(unscheduled) and is negative around settlement announcements (anticipated); see Table 3. To the con-
trary, Kim and Verrecchia (1994) argue that the increase in trading volume generated by informed traders
more than offsets the decrease in trading volume by discretionary liquidity traders, and so the overall
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increase in trading volume prior to an earnings announcement is solely driven by informed trading. In
either case, we expect that the increase in trading volume prior to operational risk first and settlement
announcements should be overwhelmingly attributed to informed traders.
In this section, we take a closer look at market liquidity surrounding operational risk announcements.
Quoted depth is the quantity limit set by the market maker and is measured as the sum of number of
shares available at bid and at ask. Past empirical studies have looked at how market makers use quoted
depth as a strategic tool to hedge against information asymmetry and how the bid-ask spread and quoted
depth interact. Dupont (2000) and Kavajecz (1998) showed that market makers may use spreads and
depths as substitutes when faced with information asymmetry.25 Earlier studies have maintained that
bid-ask spread and depth are simultaneously determined (Kavajecz, 1998, 1999; Dupont, 2000; Libby,
Mathieu, and Robb, 2002; Kanagaretnam, Lobo, and Whalen, 2005, 2007; Lee, Mucklow, and Ready,
1993). Specifically, around earnings announcements abnormal quoted depth decreases in information
asymmetry; Lee, Mucklow, and Ready (1993) showed that wider spreads are accompanied by lower
depths, but depths return to normal levels shortly (within half an hour) following the news release.
Following earlier studies (e.g., Lee, Mucklow, and Ready, 1993; Kavajecz, 1999; Dupont, 2000; Libby,
Mathieu, and Robb, 2002; Hedge and Miller, 1989; and Kanagaretnam, Lobo, and Whalen, 2005, 2007),
we model quoted depth simultaneously with our two measures of information asymmetry—effective spread
and price impact of trade—in their change forms, using a system of equations. As such, we augment
these earlier studies that use quoted bid-ask spread as a measure of information asymmetry. Simultaneous
modeling allows to correct for correlations between the error terms. In each system of two equations, the
first equation estimates ∆ QUOTED DEPTH and the second equation estimates either ∆ EFFECTIVE
SPREAD or ∆ PRICE IMPACT. Following prior empirical research, in the depth equation we include an
appropriate measure of information asymmetry along with additional control variables—NUMBER OF
SHARES and ∆ VOLUME. In the information asymmetry equation, we include ∆ QUOTED DEPTH
along with other variables included in our models described in the previous sections, but omit ∆ VOL-
UME. The simultaneous equations model is specified as follows:26
∆ QUOTED DEPTH it = α+ ξ ∆ Information Asymmetry it +
J∑
j=1
γjGovernance it,j (4)
+
R∑
r=1
ψrRisk Managementit,r +
K∑
k=1
βkAnnouncement Charactisticsit,k +
M∑
m=1
θmcontrolsit,m + εit
25Easley and O’Hara (1992) developed a theoretical model explaining the negative association between abnormal trading
volume prior to an announcement and market depth immediately following an announcement. In their model, market makers
exploit trading volume to uncover the existence of informed traders: if market makers note abnormal trading volume, they
suspect higher informed trading and react by widening the bid-ask spread and reducing the quoted depth. In this study we
do not find empirical support to this view: the association between abnormal levels of quoted depth and trading volume is
positive and significant at the 1% level, when all other factors are accounted for.
26Studies that considered trading volume as an alternative measure of liquidity have also used a system of a equations to
simultaneously model spread and volume. See for example, Aﬄeck-Graves, Callahan, and Chipalkatti (2002), Glosten and
Harris (1988), and Hedge and Miller (1989).
25
and
∆ Information Asymmetry it = α
′ + ξ′ ∆ QUOTED DEPTH it +
J∑
j=1
γ′jGovernance it,j (5)
+
R∑
r=1
ψ′rRisk Managementit,r +
K∑
k=1
β′kAnnouncement Charactisticsit,k +
M ′∑
m=1
θ′mcontrolsit,m + εit.
The results are presented in Table 10. In the information asymmetry equations, the coefficients’ signs
are for the most part consistent with our earlier models that used price impact of trade. Consistent
with earlier studies, we find that market makers use quoted depth and spread as substitutes to deal with
information risk of facing informed traders. This is evident from the coefficients of appropriate measures
of information asymmetry in the depth equations (all odd-numbered models) and the coefficients of quoted
depth in the spread equations (all even-numbered models) being negative and statistically significant at
levels 1-5% (with only one exception in Models (3) and (4)).
As expected, quoted depth increases in trading volume. The coefficient of ∆ VOLUME is positive
and significant at 1% level in all four depth equations. For banks and insurers, quoted depth is higher
than for other financial firms, which may be explained by elevated trading volume during the event
period. Interestingly, NUMBER OF ANALYSTS enters the depth models with an expected positive
sign, although the coefficient is statistically insignificant. Analyst forecasts are more accurate for firms
that have a great number of analysts following, resulting in narrower spreads (supported in our Models
(6) and (8) in this table) and more generous depths set by the market makers.
8 Conclusion
Recent regulatory initiatives call for greater market transparency in the public disclosure of financial
information. An example is the Basel Capital Accord that lays out a set of standards for financial
institutions regarding the quantification, management, and disclosure of operational risk. Other initia-
tives that address disclosure include the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999, the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, and the
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. Recent empirical research has shown that public announcements of operational
risk events are value-relevant, as market values of firms experience statistically significant drops. This
paper takes that stream of research one step further and explores the ways in which market makers react
to changes in information asymmetry caused by unscheduled operational risk announcements, and then
by their settlement announcements. In our analysis, effective bid-ask spread and price impact of trade
serve as proxies for information asymmetry. Using 15 years of data from public U.S. financial firms,
we find evidence of a substantial increase in information asymmetry around first press-cutting dates of
operational risk events and a decrease in information asymmetry around their settlement announcements.
Our empirical results are robust to various model specifications.
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We examined the role of internal and external governance and risk management on information asym-
metry. We found that stronger governance structure reduces information asymmetry around operational
risk event announcements. Specifically, around the first announcements effective spread and price im-
pact of trade are significantly negatively associated with board independence ratio, equity incentives,
and institutional ownership, and are significantly positively associated with G-Index. Similarly, around
the settlement announcements strong governance leads to smaller drops in information asymmetry. This
result offers compelling evidence that stronger governance structure reduces information asymmetry be-
tween the informed and non-informed traders. We also examined the effects of the strength of the risk
management function, proxied for by the existence of Chief Risk Officer, Chief Operational Risk Officer,
operational risk committee, enterprise-wide risk committee, and the number of years each of these had
been in place, and found that only the presence (or appointments) of senior risk officers have an impact
on information asymmetry, while risk-related committees do not. We interpret this as evidence that the
risk management function is largely driven by the regulatory compliance needs and has only a limited
impact on the level of information asymmetry between firms and investors. Alternatively, this can be
explained by the “business model channel,” in which financial firms with an aggressive risk culture may
optimally choose to undertake high risks while tightening their risk controls.
The increase in information asymmetry around first announcements is higher for internal fraud-
related events or those linked to weak business practices. This result agrees with similar findings for
earnings announcements in prior studies. This finding is particularly intriguing given that, unlike earnings
announcements that are scheduled, first announcements of operational risk are unscheduled. Therefore,
much of the abnormal trading should be attributed to informed traders while the noise trading by liquidity
traders is minimal. For the same internal events, we found that the drop in information asymmetry around
the settlement announcements is smaller than for other types of operational risk events. We believe this is
because firms choose to provide the public with more accurate and value-relevant information regarding
the remediation actions and new policies to resolve the issues, in order to avoid bad publicity and adverse
reputational consequences, which in turn reduces adverse selection.
This is the first empirical study to examine information asymmetry around operational risk announce-
ments. Our empirical findings also revealed that trading volume experiences a substantial increase around
operational risk first announcements and that quoted depth is negatively associated with information
asymmetry, showing an overall improvement in liquidity. This information might be useful for regulators
in establishing more effective operational risk disclosure requirements for financial firms. Further theo-
retical and empirical research is necessary to investigate the determinants of liquidity and explain market
makers’ decisions to increase quoted depth and the underlying drivers of elevated abnormal trading vol-
ume around such announcements. Answering these questions would contribute to our understanding
of the liquidity consequences of public disclosures of fraud and other operational risk events. Another
avenue worth exploring is comparison of information asymmetry around operational risk announcements
between non-financial corporations, banks, insurers, and other financial firms. A preliminary analysis
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suggests that there are differences in the levels and determinants of information asymmetry even within
the financial sub-industries. For example, information asymmetry around the first announcements of op-
erational risk events is better explained by the strength of internal and external governance for insurers
and non-banks, than for depository institutions, a result that may be attributable to greater disclosure
requirements for banks and differences in the governance structures. We leave this important research
question to future investigation.
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Appendix:  Description of Variables 
The following table summarizes the variables used in this study and their definitions. All dollar denominated variables are 
measured in 2009 UDFA. All continuous variables except GINDEX and FIRM SIZE are winsorized at 1% and 99%. The event 
window spans 7 trading days beginning 3 trading days prior to the announcement date and ending 3 trading days after. The 
non-event period spans 10 trading days (two weeks) commencing two calendar weeks prior to the announcement date. 
Variable Definition Source 
Information Asymmetry and Market Liquidity: 
EFFECTIVE SPREAD Daily average effective spread per transaction. Effective spread (ES) for time t is 
computed as (Lee, 1993; Huang and Stoll, 1996): 
 1002 ×
−
××=
t
tt
tt tMidpoin
ntMidpoiricePDES , where Pricet is the transaction price 
at time t and Midpointt is the midpoint of the quoted ask and bid prices immediately 
prior to the transaction. The factor Dt equals 1 for market buy orders and -1 for market 
sell orders, and factor 2 accounts for the round trip cost of transaction. Measurement 
units: Percent. 
TAQ 
Δ EFFECTIVE SPREAD Average effective spread on event day minus average effective spread in non-event 
period.  Measurement units: Percent. 
TAQ 
PRICE IMPACT Daily average price impact of trade per transaction. Price impact of trade (PIT) for 
time t is computed as (Huang and Stoll, 1996): 
1002 ×
−
××= +
t
tt
tt tMidpoin
ntMidpoiriceP
DPIT τ , where Pricet+τ is the first 
transaction price at least τ minutes after the transaction at time t, with τ taking values 
5, 15, or 30 minutes, and Midpointt is the midpoint of the quoted ask and bid prices 
immediately prior to the transaction. The factor Dt equals 1 for market buy orders and 
-1 for market sell orders, and factor 2 accounts for the round trip cost of transaction. 
Measurement units: Percent. 
TAQ 
Δ PRICE IMPACT Average price impact of trade on event day minus average price impact of trade in 
non-event period. Measurement units: Percent. 
TAQ  
QUOTED DEPTH Natural logarithm of average quoted depth per transaction on the trading day.  
Measurement units:  ln (number of shares). 
TAQ  
∆ QUOTED DEPTH Natural logarithm of average quoted depth per transaction on the trading day during 
event window minus natural logarithm of average quoted depth per transaction in 
non-event period. Measurement units:  ln (number of shares). 
TAQ 
Corporate Governance:   
BOARD INDEPENDENCE Ratio of independent board directors on the board at the end of previous year. 
Measurement units: Percent. 
RiskMetrics,     
Proxy filings 
INSIDER OWNERSHIP 
 
Proportion of shares held by all executive and non-executive directors at the end of 
previous year. Measurement units: Percent. 
Proxy filings 
BLOCK OWNERSHIP Proportion of shares held by outside blockholders at the end of previous year. 
Measurement units: Percent. 
Proxy filings 
GINDEX Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick’s (2003) governance index (G-index) at the end of 
previous year. It is an additive index constructed by giving one point to each of the 22 
firm-level antitakeover provisions and 6 state antitakeover laws, with a total of 24 
unique provisions. Higher index values indicate weaker investor protection. 
Measurement units: Whole number between 0 and 24. 
RiskMetrics 
Announcement Characteristics: 
INTERNAL FRAUD 1 if the event is of internal fraud type; 0 otherwise. Algo FIRST, 
LexisNexis, Factiva 
EXTERNAL FRAUD 1 if the event is of external fraud type; 0 otherwise. Algo FIRST, 
LexisNexis, Factiva 
CLIENTS, PRODUCTS, & 
BUSINESS PRACTICES 
1 if the event is of type Clients, Products, & Business Practices; 0 otherwise. Algo FIRST, 
LexisNexis, Factiva 
DISCLOSED BY FIRM 1 if the event is self-disclosed by the firm; 0 if the announcement is made by a third 
party, such as a client, court order, or the SEC. We considered an event self-disclosed 
if an announcement by a third party is accompanied by a statement by the firm on 
the same trading day. This variable is determined separately for first announcements 
and settlement announcements. 
Algo FIRST, 
LexisNexis, Factiva 
LOSS ANNOUNCED 1 if the announcement discloses loss amount; 0 otherwise. This variable is 
determined separately for first announcements and settlement announcements. 
Algo FIRST, 
LexisNexis, Factiva 
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Risk Management 
Variables: 
  
OPRISK OFFICER 1 if the firm has an Operational Risk Officer position; 0 otherwise. Proxy, 10-K 
filings 
OPRISK OFFICER YEARS Number of years since establishment of the Operational Risk Officer position. Proxy, 10-K 
filings 
OPRISK COMMITTEE 1 if the firm has an operational risk committee; 0 otherwise. Proxy, 10-K 
filings 
OPRISK COMMITTEE 
YEARS 
Number of years since establishment of the operational risk committee. Proxy, 10-K 
filings 
CHIEF RISK OFFICER 1 if the firm has a Chief/Senior Risk Officer position; 0 otherwise. Proxy, 10-K 
filings 
CHIEF RISK OFFICER YEARS Number of years since establishment of the Chief/Senior Risk Officer position. Proxy, 10-K 
filings 
RISK COMMITTEE 1 if the firm has a risk committee; 0 otherwise. Proxy, 10-K 
filings 
RISK COMMITTEE YEARS Number of years since establishment of the risk committee. Proxy, 10-K 
filings 
CHAIR ON RC 1 if the Board Chairman is sitting on the risk committee; 0 otherwise. Proxy, 10-K 
filings 
RISK MANAGEMENT 
SCORE 
The first principal component of the nine risk management variables, obtained via a 
singular value decomposition of the correlation matrix of risk management 
categories. The single factor is the eigenvector with the highest eigenvalue. 
Constructed by 
authors 
Control Variables: 
NUMBER OF ANALYSTS Number of analyst forecasts included in the I/B/E/S consensus earnings per share 
forecast immediately prior to announcement. 
I/B/E/S 
FIRM SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets reported at the end of the last quarter before the 
announcement. Measurement units: ln (USD million). 
Compustat  
VOLATILITY Standard deviation of the daily stock returns including dividends during the calendar 
year ending one month prior to announcement. Measurement units: Percent. 
CRSP  
LEVERAGE Leverage ratio computed by dividing total debt by total assets at the end of the last 
quarter before the announcement. Measurement units: Decimal. 
Compustat 
BETA A measure of firm’s systematic risk. Estimated as the beta factor from single-factor 
CAPM model. We use 255 days of daily equity returns and the value-weighted market 
index. 
CRSP 
PRICE Average trading price on previous trading day. Measurement units: USD. TAQ  
∆ PRICE (Average trading price on previous trading day divided by average trading price in 
non-event period) minus one.  Measurement units: Percent. 
TAQ 
NUMBER OF SHARES Natural logarithm of the number of common shares outstanding on the previous 
trading day prior to the announcement date. Measurement units: ln (thousand of 
shares). 
CRSP 
VOLUME Natural logarithm of trading volume amount on the previous trading day. 
Measurement units:  ln (number of shares). 
TAQ  
∆ VOLUME Natural logarithm of trading volume on previous trading day minus natural logarithm 
of average daily trading volume in non-event period. Measurement units:  ln (number 
of shares). 
TAQ 
DECIMAL 1 if the announcement is made after decimalization of tick size (January 29, 2001); 0 
otherwise. 
Algo FIRST, 
LexisNexis, 
Factiva 
BANKS 1 if the two-digit U.S. Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code is 60 (depository 
institutions); 0 otherwise. 
Proxy filings 
INSURERS 1 if the two-digit U.S. Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code is 63 or 64 
(insurance); 0 otherwise. 
Proxy filings 
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Table 1: Sample Selection  
  
This table describes our data screening procedure. 
 
Data Screening Description Number of Events 
1. Announcements in U.S. public financial firms with loss >$10mln during 1980-2009* 729 
       ‒ announcements during 1980-1994 ‒121 
2. Announcements in U.S. public financial firms with loss >$10mln during 1995-2009 608 
‒ announcements with unclear first press cutting date or company name  ‒88 
‒ announcements of events of type Damage to Physical Assets ‒85 
‒ announcements with missing trades and quotes data, stock price <$1, <5 trades per day ‒94 
3. Final sample: 331 
Events with both the first announcement and settlement announcement 178 
Events with only the first announcement 32 
Events with only the settlement announcement 121 
*The data were extracted from the FIRST database at the end of 2009. Settlement dates for two events (as seen in Figure 1) were 
later updated and are shown to be in 2010 and 2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Time Series Plot of Operational Risk Announcements 
 
This figure illustrates the time series of the number of operational risk announcements in our sample.  
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Figure 2: Abnormal Equity Returns around Operational Risk Announcements 
 
This figure illustrates average cumulative abnormal returns for our sample data. A market model with equal-
weighted market index was first used to estimate equity returns over 255 trading days ending 60 days prior to the 
announcement. Then, abnormal returns were computed as the difference between daily equity returns during the 
event period surrounding an announcement and the predicted returns based on the market model, and averaged 
across all events. 
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Table 2: Announcements Characteristics  
This table summarizes the characteristics of operational risk event announcements.  
 
 
Panel A: Distribution of announcements by disclosure source and loss amount 
 
Event Type Disclosure Source  Loss Amount  Total  Self-Disclosed Third Party  Disclosed Not Disclosed  
First Announcements:         
Internal Fraud 16 15  25 6  31 (15.8%) 
External Fraud 12 14  21 5  26 (13.3%) 
Employment Practices and Workplace Safety 0 11  4 7  11 (5.6%) 
Clients, Products, and Business Practices 25 88  50 63  113 (57.7%) 
Business Disruption and System Failures 2 2  2 2  4 (2.0%) 
Execution, Delivery, & Process Management 4 7  7 4  11 (5.6%) 
All First Announcements 59 137  109 87  196 (100%) 
 (30.1%) (69.9%)  (55.6%) (44.4%)  (100%)  
Settlement Announcements:         
Internal Fraud 19 19  36 2  38 (12.8%) 
External Fraud 8 13  20 1  21 (7.0%) 
Employment Practices and Workplace Safety 10 3  13 0  13 (4.4%) 
Clients, Products, and Business Practices 106 99  202 3  205 (68.8%) 
Business Disruption and System Failures 2 1  3 0  3 (1.0%) 
Execution, Delivery, & Process Management 12 6  18 0  18 (6.0%) 
All Settlement Announcements 157 141  292 6  298 (100%) 
 (52.7%) (47.3%)  (98.0%) (2.0%)  (100%)  
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Distribution of announcements by SIC industry code 
 
Event Type 
60xx 
Depository 
Institutions 
61xx 
Non-
Depository 
Institutions 
62xx 
Security & 
Commodity 
Brokers 
63xx, 64xx 
Insurance 
65xx 
Real Estate 
Total  
Internal Fraud 17 3 20 7 0 47 (14.2%) 
External Fraud 21 4 5 2 0 32 (9.7%) 
Employment Practices and Workplace Safety 1 4 9 1 0 15 (4.5%) 
Clients, Products, and Business Practices 58 24 68 61 0 211 (63.7%) 
Business Disruption and System Failures 2 0 1 1 0 4 (1.2%) 
Execution, Delivery, and Process Management 10 1 7 3 1 22 (6.7%) 
All Announcements 109 36 110 75 1 331 (100%) 
 (32.9%) (10.9%) (33.2%) (22.7%) (0.3%) (100%)  
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Figure 3: Illustration of Information Asymmetry 
 
This figure illustrates the time series of daily average measures of information asymmetry around the event window 
t = [-3, +3] for our sample data, in their level form (left) and in abnormal change form (right). 
 
      
a) Effective spread (%) 
 
 
b) Change in effective spread (%) 
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d) Change in price impact of trade (%), 30 min 
 
 
e) Price impact of trade (%), 30, 15, 5 min 
 
f) Change in price impact of trade (%), 30, 15, 5 min 
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Table 3: Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the characteristics of the firms in our data sample around the 
announcements for the event window t = [-3, +3]. 
 
Variable Announce- Num. Mean St. 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th 
 ment Obs.  Dev. perc. Perc. Perc. Perc. Perc. 
Governance & Risk Management:          
BOARD INDEPENDENCE First ann. 1,477 72.341 13.538 50.000 63.636 75.000 82.353 90.910 
 Settlement 2,114 74.433 13.642 50.000 65.385 77.778 83.333 90.909 
          
INSIDER OWNERSHIP First ann. 1,477 4.420 8.225 0.541 1.077 1.659 3.574 18.701 
 Settlement 2,114 4.525 9.556 0.623 0.989 1.524 3.091 18.845 
          
BLOCK OWNERSHIP First ann. 1,477 7.097 10.039 0.000 0.000 5.348 10.562 27.918 
 Settlement 2,114 7.678 9.998 0.000 0.000 5.569 11.472 26.962 
          
GINDEX First ann. 1,435 9.180 2.584 5.000 8.000 9.000 11.000 13.000 
 Settlement 2,058 8.983 2.485 5.000 7.000 8.000 11.000 13.000 
          
RISK MANAGEMENT SCORE First ann. 1,526 0.006 2.059 -1.558 -1.558 -0.737 1.149 4.345 
 Settlement 2,184 0.003 2.093 -1.902 -1.902 -0.847 1.646 3.550 
          
Control Variables:          
NUMBER OF ANALYSTS First ann. 1,463 17.746 6.869 6.000 14.000 17.000 22.000 31.000 
 Settlement 2,142 16.533 6.634 3.000 13.000 17.000 20.000 27.000 
          
FIRM SIZE First ann. 1,484 12.336 1.743 8.641 11.474 12.852 13.635 14.306 
 Settlement 2,156 12.351 1.968 7.697 11.516 13.054 13.728 14.417 
          
VOLATILITY First ann. 1,484 2.226 1.048 0.981 1.514 2.080 2.673 3.748 
 Settlement 2,135 2.557 1.833 0.914 1.333 2.013 2.952 6.757 
          
LEVERAGE First ann. 1,484 0.361 0.249 0.025 0.183 0.284 0.575 0.822 
 Settlement 2,156 0.326 0.240 0.020 0.138 0.266 0.558 0.783 
          
BETA  First ann. 1,484 1.306 0.427 0.715 0.971 1.322 1.604 2.090 
 Settlement 2,135 1.288 0.455 0.670 0.954 1.237 1.612 2.054 
          
PRICE First ann. 1,372 59.185 39.348 3.674 38.231 54.143 75.586 128.382 
 Settlement 2,084 55.013 33.065 4.220 31.203 51.558 74.436 114.579 
          
Δ PRICE  First ann. 1,372 -0.148 10.668 -16.313 -4.170 -0.105 4.050 16.015 
 Settlement 2,084 0.217 10.579 -15.896 -3.737 0.456 4.818 15.759 
          
VOLUME First ann. 1,372 14.430 1.873 10.982 13.550 14.607 15.608 17.044 
 Settlement 2,084 14.558 1.822 11.093 13.586 14.789 15.666 17.417 
          
Δ VOLUME  First ann. 1,372 0.041 0.654 -0.901 -0.320 -0.014 0.346 1.195 
 Settlement 2,084 -0.041 0.515 -0.870 -0.357 -0.052 0.273 0.829 
          
QUOTED DEPTH First ann. 1,372 3.513 0.961 2.124 2.895 3.393 3.982 5.209 
 Settlement 2,084 3.465 1.133 1.951 2.764 3.331 3.961 5.313 
          
Δ QUOTED DEPTH  First ann. 1,372 -0.008 0.389 -0.590 -0.253 -0.037 0.203 0.679 
 Settlement 2,084 -0.049 0.351 -0.656 -0.264 -0.053 0.158 0.555 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics: Information Asymmetry around Operational Risk Announcements 
This table reports daily average abnormal effective spread and price impact of trade, along with abnormal changes in 
these variables, around operational risk announcements. Superscripts ***, **, and * denote statistically significant 
difference of the average values from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Information asymmetry by event period and event type 
  Effective Spread   Price Impact of Trade (30 min)  
Event Type Exp. t = [-3,-1] t = [0,+3] Exp. t = [-3,-1] t = [0,+3] 
 Sign Mean (t-stat) Mean (t-stat) Sign Mean (t-stat) Mean (t-stat) 
First announcements:           
Internal Fraud  0.8283 (4.98)*** 1.4833 (5.72)***  2.5403 (5.51)*** 4.1108 (5.90)*** 
External Fraud  0.5924 (4.92)*** 0.6679 (6.03)***  2.0524 (6.99)*** 2.1521 (7.78)*** 
Clients, Products, & Business Practices  1.8380 (9.52)*** 1.7841 (11.24)***  7.1696 (7.65)*** 7.8625 (7.76)*** 
Other Events   1.5185 (3.49)*** 1.3952 (4.03)***  3.2754 (3.20)*** 2.8593 (4.95)*** 
All Events  1.4707 (11.27)*** 1.5369 (13.74)***  5.2420 (9.19)*** 5.8479 (9.65)*** 
Settlement announcements:           
Internal Fraud  1.3673 (5.04)*** 1.3464 (6.15)***  4.3405 (6.03)*** 3.5141 (9.84)*** 
External Fraud  0.6698 (2.45)*** 0.4577 (4.87)***  1.7980 (4.45)*** 1.7049 (9.64)*** 
Clients, Products, & Business Practices  1.3110 (11.00)*** 1.3308 (12.46)***  3.5844 (12.89)*** 3.3122 (15.00)*** 
Other Events   1.0685 (5.00)*** 1.0754 (5.12)***  2.9500 (6.35)*** 2.2294 (7.52)*** 
All Events  1.2453 (13.20)*** 1.2420 (15.03)***  3.4825 (15.75)*** 3.1007 (19.01)*** 
 
 
Panel B: Change in information asymmetry by event period and event type 
  Change in Effective Spread   Change in Price Impact of Trade (30 min)  
Event Type Exp. t = [-3,-1] t = [0,+3] Exp. t = [-3,-1] t = [0,+3] 
 Sign Mean (t-stat) Mean (t-stat) Sign Mean (t-stat) Mean (t-stat) 
First announcements:           
Internal Fraud  -0.1163 (-1.13) 0.5281 (2.12)***  0.1260 (0.41) 1.6970 (2.73)*** 
External Fraud  0.0843 (0.95) 0.1598 (1.99)***  0.4366 (2.07)*** 0.5363 (2.65)*** 
Clients, Products, & Business Practices  0.1148 (0.80) 0.0047 (0.04)  0.9081 (1.55)* 0.8502 (1.53)* 
Other Events   -0.4303 (-1.57) -0.4999 (-1.99)**  -1.1993 (-1.61) -1.6155 (-2.75)*** 
All Events  0.0019 (0.02) 0.0412 (0.48)  0.4423 (1.24) 0.6154 (1.78)** 
Settlement announcements:           
Internal Fraud ― 0.0877 (0.43) 0.0439 (0.28) ― -2.7021 (-2.18)*** -3.9323 (-3.27)*** 
External Fraud ― -0.0004 (-0.00) -0.1489 (-1.57)* ― -0.0589 (-0.16) -0.1520 (-0.69) 
Clients, Products, & Business Practices ― -0.0014 (-0.02) 0.0329 (0.46) ― -0.1682 (-0.48) -0.0562 (-0.24) 
Other Events  ― -0.1789 (-0.94) -0.1744 (-1.00) ― -2.3886 (-1.71)** -2.9722 (-2.50)*** 
All Events ― -0.0102 (-0.15) -0.0023 (-0.04) ― -0.7369 (-2.22)*** -0.8913 (-3.38)*** 
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Panel C: Mean comparison of information asymmetry by sub-samples of explanatory variables 
  Information Asymmetry  Change in Information Asymmetry 
Event Type Exp. Effective Spread Price Impact  ∆ Effective Spread ∆ Price Impact 
 Sign Mean (t-stat) Mean (t-stat)  Mean (t-stat) Mean (t-stat) 
           
First Announcements:           
BOARD INDEPENDENCE           
Above Median  2.0610 (12.84)*** 7.9819 (9.09)***  -0.1729 (-1.43)  0.3382 (0.76)  
Below Median  1.1162 (12.34)*** 3.4262 (12.78)***  0.2396 (3.58)*** 0.5909 (2.12)** 
Difference ― 0.9447 (5.23)*** 4.5556 (5.12)***  -0.4125 (-3.04)*** -0.2528 (-0.49)  
INSIDER OWNERSHIP           
Above Median  2.2236 (14.44)*** 8.1634 (9.95)***  0.0643 (0.57)  1.0987 (2.45)** 
Below Median  0.8264 (12.21)*** 3.1364 (13.57)***  -0.0140 (-0.24)  0.0072 (0.03)  
Difference ― 1.3972 (8.39)*** 5.0270 (5.98)***  0.0783 (0.62)  1.0916 (2.18)** 
BLOCK OWNERSHIP           
Above Median  1.4792 (13.18)*** 6.5389 (9.05)***  -0.0643 (-0.74)  0.7638 (1.99)** 
Below Median  1.5496 (12.04)*** 4.6741 (10.50)***  0.1142 (1.23)  0.3230 (1.00)  
Difference ― -0.0704 (-0.41)  1.8649 (2.19)**  -0.1785 (-1.41)  0.4407 (0.88)  
GINDEX            
Above Median  2.1463 (12.5)*** 8.6779 (8.87)***  0.0560 (0.45)  0.5500 (1.07)  
Below Median  0.9520 (11.53)*** 3.5672 (11.90)***  0.0854 (1.14)  0.5931 (2.01)** 
Difference  1.1943 (6.61)*** 5.1107 (5.39)***  -0.0294 (-0.21)  -0.0431 (-0.08)  
RISK MANAGEMENT SCORE           
Above Median  1.7665 (12.88)*** 7.1492 (9.29)***  0.1128 (1.09)  0.8310 (2.06)** 
Below Median  1.2557 (12.53)*** 4.0588 (11.30)***  -0.0624 (-0.85)  0.2573 (0.87)  
Difference ― 0.5108 (3.02)*** 3.0903 (3.66)***  0.1751 (1.39)  0.5736 (1.15)  
DISCLOSED BY FIRM           
Yes   1.3206 (9.59)*** 3.7770 (10.06)***  0.3022 (3.03)*** 1.1901 (3.95)*** 
No  1.5894 (15.00)*** 6.3683 (10.93)***  -0.0954 (-1.20)  0.2618 (0.79)  
Difference ― -0.2688 (-1.45)  -2.5913 (-2.81)***  0.3975 (2.89)*** 0.9283 (1.70)* 
LOSS AMOUNT           
Announced  1.4772 (13.68)*** 4.1372 (10.08)***  0.1371 (1.58)  0.8381 (3.23)*** 
Not Announced  1.5478 (11.44)*** 7.4063 (9.27)***  -0.1170 (-1.28)  0.1693 (0.37)  
Difference ― -0.0706 (-0.41)  -3.2691 (-3.85)***  0.2540 (2.00)** 0.6689 (1.33)  
           
Settlement Announcements:          
BOARD INDEPENDENCE           
Above Median  1.3771 (13.72)*** 3.3126 (17.3)***  -0.1078 (-1.54)  -1.0303 (-3.09)*** 
Below Median  1.1263 (14.77)*** 3.2460 (17.35)***  0.0846 (1.56)  -0.5776 (-2.25)** 
Difference  0.2509 (2.01)** 0.0666 (0.25)   -0.1925 (-2.19)** -0.4528 (-1.09)  
INSIDER OWNERSHIP           
Above Median  1.6262 (15.51)*** 3.9721 (18.08)***  -0.0278 (-0.38)  -1.2681 (-3.40)*** 
Below Median  0.8574 (13.29)*** 2.5638 (17.42)***  0.0119 (0.24)  -0.3102 (-1.75)* 
Difference  0.7688 (6.20)*** 1.4083 (5.30)***  -0.0396 (-0.45)  -0.9580 (-2.30)** 
BLOCK OWNERSHIP           
Above Median  1.2874 (14.09)*** 3.3985 (17.12)***  -0.0917 (-1.40)  -1.5942 (-4.53)*** 
Below Median  1.2066 (14.15)*** 3.1559 (17.61)***  0.0765 (1.31)  0.0144 (0.07)  
Difference  0.0808 (0.65)  0.2426 (0.91)   -0.1682 (-1.91)* -1.6086 (-3.87)*** 
GINDEX            
Above Median  1.4016 (14.32)*** 3.3172 (17.75)***  -0.0819 (-1.24)  -1.1927 (-3.60)*** 
Below Median  0.9627 (8.41)*** 3.0200 (9.94)***  -0.0271 (-0.30)  -0.4480 (-1.32)  
Difference ― 0.4390 (2.79)*** 0.2972 (0.88)   -0.0547 (-0.49)  -0.7447 (-1.45)  
RISK MANAGEMENT SCORE           
Above Median  1.3473 (14.01)*** 3.6904 (17.91)***  -0.0773 (-1.11)  -1.1984 (-3.44)*** 
Below Median  1.1407 (14.47)*** 2.8435 (16.96)***  0.0651 (1.22)  -0.4560 (-2.01)** 
Difference  0.2065 (1.66)* 0.8468 (3.19)***  -0.1425 (-1.63)  -0.7424 (-1.79)* 
DISCLOSED BY FIRM           
Yes   1.2958 (14.23)*** 3.3659 (16.93)***  0.1001 (1.56)  -1.1668 (-3.42)*** 
No  1.1850 (14.20)*** 3.1514 (18.20)***  -0.1237 (-2.11)** -0.4439 (-2.04)** 
Difference  0.1108 (0.89)  0.2145 (0.81)   0.2237 (2.56)** -0.7229 (-1.74)* 
LOSS AMOUNT           
Announced  1.2584 (19.87)*** 3.2859 (24.25)***  0.0081 (0.18)  -0.8199 (-3.88)*** 
Not Announced  0.5162 (3.93)*** 2.2244 (6.28)***  -0.6764 (-2.48)** -1.0775 (-1.98)** 
Difference  0.7421 (1.68)* 1.0616 (1.12)   0.6845 (2.20)** 0.2576 (0.17)  
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Table 5: Multivariate Results: Determinants of Information Asymmetry  
This table presents the results of our OLS model. The dependent variable is a daily measure of information asymmetry during 
t = [-3,+3]. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Superscripts ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
  First Announcements  Settlement Announcements 
Variable  Effective Spread Price Impact (30 min)  Effective Spread Price Impact (30 min) 
 Exp. (1) (2) (3) (4) Exp. (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Sign Level Change (Δ) Level Change (Δ) Sign Level Change (Δ) Level Change (Δ) 
Governance and Risk Management:           
BOARD INDEPENDENCE ― -0.0212 -0.0229 -0.0092 -0.0294  0.0026 0.0048 -0.0237 0.0079 
  (-2.96)*** (-3.57)*** (-0.27)  (-1.15)   (0.47)  (1.04)  (-1.83)* (0.51)  
INSIDER OWNERSHIP ― -0.0480 -0.0232 -0.1652 -0.0661  0.0482 0.0327 0.0975 0.0752 
  (-4.14)*** (-2.66)*** (-3.61)*** (-1.88)*  (2.71)*** (2.67)*** (2.47)** (2.00)** 
BLOCK OWNERSHIP ― -0.0105 -0.0237 -0.0938 -0.0363  0.0085 0.0151 0.0213 0.0838 
  (-1.13)  (-3.01)*** (-2.49)** (-1.58)   (1.17)  (2.93)*** (1.43)  (2.88)*** 
GINDEX  0.1362 0.0410 0.4625 -0.0792 ― -0.0490 -0.0053 -0.0707 0.2528 
  (3.85)*** (1.60)  (3.14)*** (-0.69)   (-1.86)* (-0.24)  (-1.24)  (2.79)*** 
RISK MANAGEMENT SCORE ― 0.0359 0.0577 0.4109 0.3000  -0.0923 -0.0373 -0.1445 0.3956 
  (0.93)  (1.44)  (1.45)  (1.72)*  (-2.30)** (-1.08)  (-1.65)* (3.19)*** 
Announcement Characteristics:           
INTERNAL FRAUD  -0.5053 0.3351 0.9637 1.8281  0.3111 0.3687 0.8146 -0.5769 
  (-1.70)* (1.43)  (1.07)  (2.57)***  (1.44)  (1.82)* (1.72)* (-0.46)  
EXTERNAL FRAUD  -0.7477 0.2911 -2.5348 -0.0502 ― -0.2993 0.1327 -0.9377 1.6934 
  (-2.70)*** (1.42)  (-2.21)** (-0.08)   (-1.28)  (0.72)  (-2.23)** (1.96)** 
CLIENTS, PRODUCTS, & BUS. PRACTICES  -0.1719 0.2027 2.5910 1.3605  0.2564 0.2766 0.5279 2.7015 
  (-0.61)  (0.89)  (2.74)*** (1.82)*  (1.46)  (1.83)* (1.54)  (2.95)*** 
DISCLOSED BY FIRM ― 0.2913 0.0757 -0.6579 -0.4756  0.2665 0.2225 0.6760 -0.8801 
  (1.44)  (0.48)  (-1.02)  (-1.03)   (2.18)** (2.38)** (2.46)** (-2.02)** 
LOSS ANNOUNCED ― 0.1578 0.3295 -3.0073 1.2339  0.9102 0.7858 2.0749 -0.4558 
  (0.91)  (2.20)** (-2.99)*** (2.06)**  (5.47)*** (2.66)*** (4.06)*** (-0.61)  
Control Variables:           
NUMBER OF ANALYSTS  0.0714 0.0106 0.6051 0.1393  0.1070 -0.0035 0.1921 -0.0895 
  (5.08)*** (0.92)  (4.41)*** (1.94)*  (8.59)*** (-0.38)  (6.36)*** (-2.02)** 
FIRM SIZE  0.4091 -0.1540 -1.3330 -1.5782  0.4537 0.0921 0.5034 0.5356 
  (4.35)*** (-3.18)*** (-1.86)* (-4.32)***  (7.35)*** (2.40)** (3.19)*** (2.24)** 
VOLATILITY  0.3797 -0.0729 1.0666 -0.3659  -0.0336 -0.0492 -0.2813 -0.2236 
  (3.57)*** (-0.97)  (2.54)** (-1.37)   (-0.75)  (-1.61)  (-2.61)*** (-1.60)  
LEVERAGE  0.8562 0.0398 0.8577 -0.7955  0.5099 -0.9622 1.6110 -5.0631 
  (1.67)* (0.10)  (0.35)  (-0.40)   (1.11)  (-2.78)*** (1.59)  (-3.71)*** 
BETA  -0.3571 0.1463 6.4675 3.3125  -0.0765 0.1129 1.4999 0.0318 
  (-1.18)  (0.58)  (3.56)*** (3.14)***  (-0.40)  (0.82)  (2.85)*** (0.05)  
(Δ) PRICE  -0.0184 -0.0226 -0.0427 -0.0078  -0.0188 -0.0108 -0.0294 -0.0363 
  (-6.74)*** (-2.37)** (-3.68)*** (-0.16)   (-7.45)*** (-2.19)** (-5.42)*** (-1.29)  
(Δ) VOLUME  -0.8837 0.0507 -2.0200 1.8413  -0.7789 0.3301 -0.8284 0.3573 
  (-9.13)*** (0.28)  (-3.66)*** (2.59)***  (-11.22)*** (3.44)*** (-5.62)*** (0.62)  
DECIMAL  1.6659 0.4650 8.5909 2.5379  1.6818 -0.0783 3.7375 -2.8351 
  (5.92)*** (2.18)** (6.10)*** (3.23)***  (9.51)*** (-0.77)  (10.16)*** (-4.41)*** 
BANKS  -0.2017 0.5011 -1.3663 0.5328  -0.6695 0.1414 -0.1574 1.9993 
  (-1.35)  (3.54)*** (-1.54)  (0.76)   (-3.93)*** (1.04)  (-0.36)  (3.21)*** 
INSURERS  0.5915 1.1629 -0.9986 1.5359  -0.9211 -0.2146 -0.0890 1.1482 
  (1.51)  (4.06)*** (-0.72)  (1.38)   (-4.05)*** (-1.24)  (-0.15)  (2.03)** 
Constant  7.7821 2.0790 24.6393 13.7076  4.1159 -2.4087 1.9414 -7.2450 
  (7.67)*** (2.81)*** (4.07)*** (3.83)***  (5.00)*** (-4.14)*** (1.03)  (-2.35)** 
Number of observations  1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316  2,014 2,014 2,014 2,014 
F-stat. all variables  12.04 3.43 5.48 3.34  16.89 3.29 12.59 2.99 
[Prob > F]  [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***  [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
F-stat. governance & risk management  5.91 3.98 4.50 3.65  4.41 4.36 7.11 4.05 
[Prob > F]  [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.003]***  [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** 
F-stat. announcement characteristics  2.39 2.09 5.01 3.13  9.29 3.55 8.46 3.55 
[Prob > F]  [0.036]** [0.064]* [0.000]*** [0.008]***  [0.000]*** [0.003]*** [0.000]*** [0.003]*** 
R2  0.3045 0.0779 0.1536 0.0821  0.2841 0.0393 0.1429 0.0505 
AIC  6,360.21 5,959.40 10,854.48 9,573.49  9,343.60 8,527.50 12,769.94 14,766.67 
BIC  6,469.04 6,068.23 10,963.31 9,682.32  9,461.36 8,645.27 12,887.70 14,884.44 
 
42 
 
Table 6: Multivariate Results: Information Asymmetry During Pre- and Post-Announcement Periods 
The dependent variable is a daily measure of information asymmetry during pre-announcement period t = [-3,-1] and 
during post-announcement period t = [0,+3]. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. Superscripts ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Panel A: First announcements 
  Effective Spread  Price Impact of Trade (30 min) 
Variable  Level Change (Δ)  Level Change (Δ) 
 Exp. (1) (2) (3) (4) Exp. (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Sign t=[-3,-1] t=[0,+3] t=[-3,-1] t=[0,+3] Sign t=[-3,-1] t=[0,+3] t=[-3,-1] t=[0,+3] 
Governance and Risk Management:           
BOARD INDEPENDENCE ― -0.0123 -0.0282 -0.0110 -0.0316 ― 0.0178 -0.0316 0.0059 -0.0532 
  (-1.24)  (-3.03)*** (-1.20)  (-3.83)***  (0.44)  (-0.63)  (0.16)  (-1.58)  
INSIDER OWNERSHIP ― -0.0180 -0.0698 -0.0018 -0.0397 ― -0.0534 -0.2520 0.0066 -0.1197 
  (-1.29)  (-4.47)*** (-0.17)  (-3.28)***  (-0.89)  (-3.81)*** (0.12)  (-2.66)*** 
BLOCK OWNERSHIP ― -0.0006 -0.0180 -0.0134 -0.0305 ― -0.0202 -0.1496 0.0134 -0.0705 
  (-0.05)  (-1.43)  (-1.21)  (-2.91)***  (-0.49)  (-2.56)** (0.46)  (-2.07)** 
GINDEX  0.1533 0.1256 0.0512 0.0323  0.1733 0.6832 -0.3479 0.1103 
  (2.83)*** (2.72)*** (1.46)  (0.91)   (0.77)  (3.57)*** (-1.92)* (0.78)  
RISK MANAGEMENT SCORE ― 0.0686 0.0199 0.0362 0.0674 ― 0.1664 0.6147 0.0507 0.4640 
  (1.12)  (0.39)  (0.62)  (1.21)   (0.47)  (1.44)  (0.21)  (1.86)* 
Announcement Characteristics:           
INTERNAL FRAUD  -0.6098 -0.3851 0.1721 0.4793  0.6565 1.2487 1.7713 1.9019 
  (-1.43)  (-0.94)  (0.57)  (1.43)   (0.50)  (1.00)  (1.72)* (1.98)** 
EXTERNAL FRAUD  -0.4761 -0.8917 0.3146 0.3076  -1.6511 -3.1618 0.3483 -0.2519 
  (-1.14)  (-2.38)** (1.08)  (1.05)   (-1.07)  (-1.92)* (0.37)  (-0.26)  
CLIENTS, PRODUCTS, & BUS. PRACTICES  0.1227 -0.3468 0.4224 0.0683  2.3727 2.7727 1.5041 1.3209 
  (0.28)  (-0.93)  (1.21)  (0.22)   (1.77)* (2.18)** (1.33)  (1.34)  
DISCLOSED BY FIRM ― 0.3896 0.2046 0.3654 -0.1354 ― 0.3989 -1.4522 0.5659 -1.2739 
  (1.45)  (0.73)  (1.95)* (-0.60)   (0.45)  (-1.63)  (0.91)  (-2.00)** 
LOSS ANNOUNCED ― -0.1896 0.4244 -0.0533 0.6463 ― -4.6756 -1.7677 -0.4184 2.5406 
  (-0.74)  (1.81)* (-0.24)  (3.27)***  (-3.55)*** (-1.22)  (-0.53)  (2.94)*** 
Control Variables:           
NUMBER OF ANALYSTS  0.0566 0.0818 -0.0032 0.0194  0.4066 0.7557 0.0536 0.2012 
  (2.63)*** (4.36)*** (-0.18)  (1.27)   (2.15)** (3.88)*** (0.49)  (2.16)** 
FIRM SIZE  0.5902 0.2896 -0.0219 -0.2380  -0.5066 -1.9357 -1.1491 -1.8599 
  (4.61)*** (2.31)** (-0.35)  (-3.51)***  (-0.56)  (-1.86)* (-2.38)** (-3.56)*** 
VOLATILITY  0.5613 0.2610 0.0617 -0.1755  1.2803 0.9340 -0.2925 -0.4197 
  (3.57)*** (1.87)* (0.52)  (-1.84)*  (2.59)*** (1.51)  (-0.70)  (-1.18)  
LEVERAGE  -0.5239 1.8058 -1.1535 0.8122  -5.5222 5.5646 -5.0087 2.1931 
  (-0.74)  (2.62)*** (-2.16)** (1.44)   (-1.23)  (2.32)** (-1.36)  (1.16)  
BETA  -0.9088 0.0526 -0.2291 0.4613  4.5868 7.9190 2.6322 3.8500 
  (-1.80)* (0.14)  (-0.57)  (1.43)   (1.76)* (3.13)*** (1.66)* (2.71)*** 
(Δ) PRICE  -0.0135 -0.0212 -0.0097 -0.0265  -0.0416 -0.0427 0.0740 -0.0414 
  (-3.64)*** (-5.52)*** (-0.62)  (-2.24)**  (-2.39)** (-2.70)*** (0.74)  (-0.80)  
(Δ) VOLUME  -0.9946 -0.8320 -0.1577 0.1154  -1.9289 -2.1631 1.7521 1.8847 
  (-6.88)*** (-6.68)*** (-0.57)  (0.51)   (-4.05)*** (-2.42)** (1.41)  (2.21)** 
DECIMAL  1.5173 1.8292 -0.0285 0.8343  5.9819 10.6789 1.3011 3.4480 
  (3.78)*** (4.69)*** (-0.09)  (3.12)***  (3.84)*** (4.89)*** (1.14)  (3.21)*** 
BANKS  -0.5169 0.0365 0.1922 0.7344  -2.3320 -0.6171 -0.5874 1.3603 
  (-2.21)** (0.19)  (0.91)  (3.83)***  (-1.71)* (-0.54)  (-0.52)  (1.59)  
INSURERS  -0.8700 1.6553 -0.0054 2.0238  -5.1150 2.1360 -1.6980 3.8652 
  (-1.90)* (2.98)*** (-0.02)  (4.99)***  (-2.28)** (1.30)  (-0.89)  (3.24)*** 
Constant  7.2799 8.2854 0.8740 2.7581  23.8169 25.9675 13.8492 12.9904 
  (4.76)*** (6.37)*** (0.85)  (2.86)***  (3.21)*** (2.80)*** (2.50)** (2.95)*** 
Number of observations  564 752 564 752  564 752 564 752 
F-stat. all variables  5.49 6.80 1.54 3.16  3.32 2.95 1.47 3.41 
[Prob > F]  [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.066]* [0.000]***  [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.086]* [0.000]*** 
F-stat. governance & risk management  2.02 5.04 1.03 4.71  0.43 4.88 1.18 3.67 
[Prob > F]  [0.074]* [0.000]*** [0.400] [0.000]***  [0.829] [0.000]*** [0.319] [0.003]*** 
F-stat. announcement characteristics  2.38 1.85 1.44 3.36  3.16 2.88 0.89 3.49 
[Prob > F]  [0.037]** [0.101] [0.210] [0.005]***  [0.008]*** [0.014]** [0.488] [0.004]*** 
R2  0.3423 0.3048 0.0415 0.1450  0.1765 0.1590 0.0872 0.1141 
AIC  2,724.63 3,645.45 2,558.99 3,404.97  4,516.69 6,332.57 4,049.67 5,528.27 
BIC  2,815.66 3,742.52 2,650.03 3,502.05  4,607.73 6,429.65 4,140.71 5,625.35 
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Panel B: Settlement announcements 
 
  Effective Spread  Price Impact of Trade (30 min) 
Variable  Level Change (Δ)  Level Change (Δ) 
 Exp. (1) (2) (3) (4) Exp. (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Sign t=[-3,-1] t=[0,+3] t=[-3,-1] t=[0,+3] Sign t=[-3,-1] t=[0,+3] t=[-3,-1] t=[0,+3] 
Governance and Risk Management:           
BOARD INDEPENDENCE  0.0013 0.0037 0.0039 0.0053  -0.0118 -0.0326 0.0119 0.0032 
  (0.15)  (0.49)  (0.55)  (0.89)   (-0.58)  (-1.95)* (0.48)  (0.16)  
INSIDER OWNERSHIP  0.0370 0.0567 0.0224 0.0403  0.1108 0.0876 0.0728 0.0755 
  (1.44)  (2.32)** (1.28)  (2.40)**  (1.78)* (1.71)* (1.26)  (1.50)  
BLOCK OWNERSHIP  0.0056 0.0109 0.0168 0.0136  0.0269 0.0175 0.0898 0.0764 
  (0.51)  (1.10)  (2.22)** (1.92)*  (1.03)  (1.03)  (2.05)** (1.98)** 
GINDEX ― -0.0660 -0.0364 -0.0175 0.0039 ― -0.1605 -0.0029 0.1569 0.3228 
  (-1.56)  (-1.08)  (-0.49)  (0.14)   (-1.66)* (-0.04)  (1.18)  (2.62)*** 
RISK MANAGEMENT SCORE  -0.0988 -0.0884 -0.0241 -0.0470  -0.0581 -0.2092 0.5169 0.3043 
  (-1.46)  (-1.80)* (-0.41)  (-1.13)   (-0.36)  (-2.26)** (2.52)** (1.97)** 
Announcement Characteristics:           
INTERNAL FRAUD  0.3634 0.2718 0.4073 0.3402  0.9155 0.7402 -0.2811 -0.8123 
  (1.11)  (0.93)  (1.27)  (1.29)   (1.04)  (1.45)  (-0.15)  (-0.48)  
EXTERNAL FRAUD ― -0.1800 -0.3799 0.2969 0.0020 ― -1.3798 -0.5904 1.2133 1.9464 
  (-0.44)  (-1.38)  (0.94)  (0.01)   (-1.81)* (-1.25)  (0.90)  (1.72)* 
CLIENTS, PRODUCTS, & BUS. PRACTICES  0.2821 0.2375 0.2749 0.2786  0.3434 0.6678 2.0959 3.1311 
  (1.09)  (0.99)  (1.22)  (1.36)   (0.57)  (1.68)* (1.46)  (2.62)*** 
DISCLOSED BY FIRM  0.2626 0.2726 0.2507 0.1980  0.5631 0.7685 -1.1007 -0.7576 
  (1.34)  (1.74)* (1.68)* (1.65)*  (1.20)  (2.33)** (-1.54)  (-1.38)  
LOSS ANNOUNCED  0.8007 0.9941 0.6335 0.9011  1.9373 2.1798 -0.8045 -0.1702 
  (2.95)*** (4.73)*** (1.55)  (2.14)**  (1.98)** (4.08)*** (-0.74)  (-0.16)  
Control Variables:           
NUMBER OF ANALYSTS  0.1063 0.1074 -0.0042 -0.0029  0.2254 0.1672 -0.0868 -0.0909 
  (5.56)*** (6.51)*** (-0.30)  (-0.24)   (4.47)*** (4.53)*** (-1.21)  (-1.62)  
FIRM SIZE  0.4195 0.4783 0.0919 0.0917  0.3067 0.6502 0.3806 0.6451 
  (4.33)*** (5.94)*** (1.57)  (1.80)*  (1.10)  (3.65)*** (1.07)  (2.01)** 
VOLATILITY  -0.0223 -0.0439 -0.0445 -0.0519  -0.4062 -0.1895 -0.3196 -0.1487 
  (-0.32)  (-0.75)  (-0.93)  (-1.30)   (-2.35)** (-1.38)  (-1.47)  (-0.81)  
LEVERAGE  0.4542 0.5498 -1.1371 -0.8260  1.5670 1.6275 -5.4502 -4.6825 
  (0.59)  (0.96)  (-2.00)** (-1.91)*  (0.84)  (1.51)  (-2.43)** (-2.78)*** 
BETA  -0.2198 0.0277 -0.0923 0.2698  1.7631 1.2997 -0.1185 0.2127 
  (-0.78)  (0.11)  (-0.45)  (1.44)   (2.11)** (1.91)* (-0.12)  (0.27)  
(Δ) PRICE  -0.0175 -0.0198 -0.0107 -0.0108  -0.0237 -0.0336 -0.0040 -0.0529 
  (-4.45)*** (-5.97)*** (-1.34)  (-1.72)*  (-2.55)** (-5.21)*** (-0.09)  (-1.50)  
(Δ) VOLUME  -0.7165 -0.8214 0.2912 0.3716  -0.7208 -0.9068 -0.2616 0.7091 
  (-6.20)*** (-9.52)*** (1.58)  (3.44)***  (-3.19)*** (-4.72)*** (-0.25)  (1.08)  
DECIMAL  1.6638 1.6915 -0.1091 -0.0564  3.8586 3.6454 -2.9426 -2.7555 
  (6.08)*** (7.23)*** (-0.71)  (-0.41)   (6.51)*** (7.81)*** (-2.95)*** (-3.27)*** 
BANKS  -0.8064 -0.5656 0.0790 0.1860  -0.3703 0.0039 2.0614 1.9717 
  (-3.01)*** (-2.54)** (0.38)  (1.03)   (-0.53)  (0.01)  (2.11)** (2.43)** 
INSURERS  -1.1227 -0.7653 -0.3643 -0.1046  -0.5359 0.2518 0.7057 1.4888 
  (-2.88)*** (-2.80)*** (-1.18)  (-0.53)   (-0.50)  (0.41)  (0.71)  (2.26)** 
Constant  4.2492 3.9648 -1.7017 -2.9286  2.3731 1.5794 -3.1891 -10.1394 
  (3.34)*** (3.64)*** (-1.99)** (-3.67)***  (0.78)  (0.66)  (-0.68)  (-2.47)** 
Number of observations  864 1,150 864 1,150  864 1,150 864 1,150 
F-stat. all variables  7.00 10.36 1.41 2.30  5.66 7.29 1.25 2.20 
[Prob > F]  [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.111] [0.001]***  [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.203] [0.002]*** 
F-stat. governance & risk management  1.71 2.90 1.95 2.99  2.74 6.38 2.11 2.37 
[Prob > F]  [0.129] [0.013]** [0.083]* [0.011]**  [0.018]** [0.000]*** [0.062]* [0.038]** 
F-stat. announcement characteristics  2.98 6.74 1.44 2.50  3.09 5.99 0.96 3.10 
[Prob > F]  [0.011]** [0.000]*** [0.206] [0.029]**  [0.009]*** [0.000]*** [0.440] [0.009]*** 
R2  0.2489 0.3137 0.0323 0.0505  0.1241 0.1723 0.0435 0.0640 
AIC  4,063.22 5,315.28 3,727.96 4,832.68  5,667.84 7,094.78 6,450.64 8,339.80 
BIC  4,163.21 5,421.28 3,827.95 4,938.68  5,767.84 7,200.78 6,550.63 8,445.79 
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Figure 4: Risk Management in Firms with Operational Risk Announcements during 1995-2013 
This figure illustrates the time series behavior of risk management traits of the firms in our sample. 
Panel A: First announcements 
 
Panel B: Settlement announcements 
 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics of Risk Management Variables 
This table describes sample statistics of the risk management variables in our sample data, for events in firms with 
non-zero values of these variables. 
Variable Name Examples of Titles from Our Data Sample Descriptive Statistics 
   Mean 
(years) 
Min 
(years) 
Max 
(years) 
Count Prop. 
OPRISK OFFICER Chief Operational Risk Officer, Operational 
Risk Manager, Head of Operational Risk 
First ann.    15 7.61% 
 Settlement    32 10.74% 
OPRISK OFFICER YEARS  First ann. 2.00 0.5 5   
  Settlement 1.97 0.5 6   
OPRISK COMMITTEE Compliance and Operational Risk 
Committee, Operational Risk Committee, 
Operational Risk Management Group, 
Enterprise Operational Risk Management, 
Operational Risk Council, Operational Risk 
Oversight Committee 
First ann.    44 22.33% 
 Settlement    101 33.89% 
OPRISK COMMITTEE YEARS  First ann. 2.83 0.5 8   
  Settlement 2.82 0.5 9   
CHIEF RISK OFFICER Chief/Senior Risk Officer, Enterprise Risk 
Officer, Chief Risk Management Officer, 
Chief Risk Policy Officer, Senior Vice 
President for Risk Management 
First ann.    87 44.16% 
 Settlement    139 46.64% 
CHIEF RISK OFFICER YEARS  First ann. 3.52 0.5 12   
  Settlement 4.46 0.5 14   
RISK COMMITTEE Global Risk Committee, Risk Management 
Committee, Risk Policy Committee, Risk 
Oversight Committee, Firmwide Risk 
Committee, Enterprise Risk Committee 
First ann.    108 54.82% 
 Settlement    162 54.36% 
RISK COMMITTEE YEARS  First ann. 4.96 0.5 15   
  Settlement 5.81 0.5 16   
CHAIR ON RC  First ann.    18 9.14% 
  Settlement    14 4.70% 
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Table 8: Multivariate Results: Information Asymmetry and Risk Management 
This table focuses on the impact of individual risk management variables on information asymmetry around operational 
risk announcements. The dependent variable is the change in price impact of trade from non-event period during the event 
window t = [-3,+3]. Models (1) and (5) in this table are Models (4) and (8) from Table 5, respectively. t-statistics based on 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Superscripts ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
  First Announcements  Settlement Announcements 
Variable Exp. Change (Δ) in Price Impact of Trade (30 min) Exp. Change (Δ) in Price Impact of Trade (30 min) 
 Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) Sign (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Governance:           
BOARD INDEPENDENCE ― -0.0294 -0.0341 -0.0216 -0.0284  0.0349 0.0188 0.0130 0.0230 
  (-1.15)  (-1.28)  (-0.84)  (-1.03)   (2.40)** (1.12)  (0.84)  (1.34)  
INSIDER OWNERSHIP ― -0.0661 -0.0698 -0.0592 -0.0540  0.0995 0.0803 0.0841 0.0939 
  (-1.88)* (-1.99)** (-1.60)  (-1.47)   (2.77)*** (2.17)** (2.41)** (2.74)*** 
BLOCK OWNERSHIP ― -0.0363 -0.0456 -0.0265 -0.0364  0.0686 0.0854 0.1044 0.1095 
  (-1.58)  (-1.94)* (-0.91)  (-1.19)   (2.33)** (2.92)*** (3.53)*** (3.63)*** 
GINDEX  -0.0792 -0.1050 -0.0595 -0.0370 ― 0.1118 0.2002 0.1360 0.1573 
  (-0.69)  (-0.96)  (-0.45)  (-0.28)   (1.26)  (2.38)** (1.43)  (1.63)  
Risk Management:           
RISK MANAGEMENT SCORE ― 0.3000     0.2021    
  (1.72)*     (1.77)*    
OPRISK OFFICER ―  -1.5903  -1.5542   2.2611  2.5937 
   (-0.80)   (-0.80)    (1.98)**  (2.30)** 
OPRISK OFFICER*OPRISK OFFICER YEARS ―  0.3011  0.1849   0.4100  0.1324 
   (0.52)   (0.33)    (1.50)   (0.43)  
ORISK COMMITTEE ―  1.6595  1.9155   1.1215  1.0367 
   (1.65)*  (1.67)*   (1.52)   (1.00)  
ORISK COMM*OPRISK COMM YEARS ―  0.1190  0.0717   -0.3843  -0.3406 
   (0.53)   (0.30)    (-3.03)***  (-2.48)** 
CHIEF RISK OFFICER ―   -0.0599 -0.2478    1.7979 1.2748 
    (-0.08)  (-0.35)     (2.65)*** (2.14)** 
CHIEF RISK OFFICIER*CRO YEARS ―   0.1179 0.0611    0.1867 0.1671 
    (1.16)  (0.55)     (2.31)** (1.76)* 
RISK COMMITTEE ―   -0.2943 -0.5321    -1.4893 -2.1225 
    (-0.35)  (-0.55)     (-2.66)*** (-2.59)*** 
RISK COMMITTEE*RISK COMM YEARS ―   0.0712 0.0841    -0.1005 -0.0651 
    (0.78)  (0.86)     (-1.93)* (-1.16)  
RISK COMMITTEE*CHAIR ON RC ―   2.4836 2.8087    1.6817 1.7572 
    (1.93)* (2.10)**    (2.01)** (2.09)** 
Announcement Characteristics:           
INTERNAL FRAUD  1.8281 1.7626 1.6667 1.5717  -0.2614 0.1181 -1.1645 -0.4854 
  (2.57)*** (2.52)** (2.29)** (2.20)**  (-0.20)  (0.09)  (-0.90)  (-0.35)  
EXTERNAL FRAUD  -0.0502 -0.2195 -0.2938 -0.6329 ― 2.1111 2.3190 0.9773 1.4399 
  (-0.08)  (-0.33)  (-0.44)  (-0.90)   (2.43)** (2.56)** (1.11)  (1.57)  
CLIENTS, PRODUCTS, & BUS. PRACTICES  1.3605 1.1635 1.4294 1.2090  2.8729 3.2269 2.3383 2.8890 
  (1.82)* (1.49)  (1.93)* (1.54)   (3.32)*** (3.25)*** (2.47)** (2.80)*** 
DISCLOSED BY FIRM ― -0.4756 -0.4513 -0.7152 -0.7350  -0.6569 -0.9283 -1.0348 -1.0725 
  (-1.03)  (-0.99)  (-1.49)  (-1.54)   (-1.62)  (-2.12)** (-2.32)** (-2.40)** 
LOSS ANNOUNCED ― 1.2339 1.2283 1.0983 1.0494  -0.4417 -0.0455 -0.6534 -0.4559 
  (2.06)** (1.98)** (1.73)* (1.61)   (-0.56)  (-0.06)  (-0.82)  (-0.54)  
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations  1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316  2,014 2,014 2,014 2,014 
F-stat. all variables  3.34 3.03 3.18 2.93  2.70 3.20 2.95 3.20 
[Prob > F]  [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***  [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
F-stat. risk management   1.16 1.58 1.46   5.40 4.48 3.66 
[Prob > F]   [0.325] [0.163] [0.158]  [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** 
R2  0.0821 0.0830 0.0860 0.0889  0.0780 0.0548 0.0623 0.0678 
AIC  9,573.49 9,578.19 9,575.90 9,579.77  14,707.46 14,763.69 17,749.46 14,745.73 
BIC  9,682.32 9,702.56 9,705.46 9,730.06  14,825.23 14,898.28 14,889.66 14,908.36 
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Table 9: Robustness Checks for Determinants of Information Asymmetry 
This table presents the results of robustness checks. The dependent variable is the change in price impact of trade from non-
event period during t = [-3,+3]. Model 0 in Panel A is Model (4) for first announcements and in Panel B is Model (8) for the 
settlement announcements from Table 5, respectively. In RC1 the dependent variable is the average change in effective 
spread per transaction during the event period, and the data is in cross-section form. In RC2 we exclude the post-credit crisis 
period. Additionally, we run separate models for fraud (RC3), Clients, Products, and Business Practices events (RC4), and all 
other events (RC5). In RC6 we include year fixed effects. In RC7 we eliminate events disclosed during scheduled earnings 
announcements or restatement announcements. In RC8, we redefine our risk management score as an additive index 
obtained by the sum of six risk management variables: OPRISK OFFICER, OPRISK COMMITTEE, CHAIR ON OPRISK COMMITTEE, 
CHIEF RISK OFFICER, RISK COMMITTEE, and CHAIR ON RISK COMMITTEE. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Superscripts ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
Panel A: Change in price impact of trade around first announcements 
  Model 0 RC1 RC2 RC3 RC4 RC5 RC6 RC7 RC8 
Variable Exp. Table 5: Cross- Pre- Events: Events: Events: Incl. Year Excl. Earn. RM 
 Sign Model (4) Section Crisis Fraud CPBP Other Fixed Eff. Ann. Score 
Governance & Risk Mangmt:           
BOARD INDEPENDENCE ― -0.0294 -0.0279 -0.0299 -0.0157 -0.0161 0.0307 -0.0167 -0.0208 -0.0319 
  (-1.15) (-0.68) (-1.13) (-0.71) (-0.36) (0.22) (-0.61)  (-0.75)  (-1.25)  
INSIDER OWNERSHIP ― -0.0661 -0.0579 -0.0648 -0.1264 -0.0387 0.1892 -0.0770 -0.0652 -0.0690 
  (-1.88)* (-1.03) (-1.83)* (-1.16) (-0.81) (0.76) (-2.10)** (-1.81)* (-1.90)* 
BLOCK OWNERSHIP ― -0.0363 -0.0359 -0.0341 0.0066 -0.0834 -0.0210 -0.0284 -0.0405 -0.0349 
  (-1.58) (-1.07) (-1.49) (0.31) (-1.99)** (-0.13) (-1.25)  (-1.67)* (-1.52)  
GINDEX  -0.0792 -0.0693 -0.0795 -0.1353 -0.1503 0.1788 0.0142 -0.0299 -0.0838 
  (-0.69) (-0.37) (-0.66) (-0.91) (-0.85) (1.09) (0.10)  (-0.25)  (-0.73)  
RISK MANAGEMENT SCORE ― 0.3000 0.2979 0.3131 0.0420 0.5945 -0.3394 0.5498 0.4215 0.5116 
  (1.72)* (0.91) (1.60) (0.29) (2.50)** (-0.57) (2.55)** (2.16)** (1.61)  
Announcement Characteristics:           
INTERNAL FRAUD  1.8281 1.8641 1.8876    2.0833 1.9186 1.7969 
  (2.57)*** (1.59) (2.60)***    (2.74)*** (2.28)** (2.52)** 
EXTERNAL FRAUD  -0.0502 -0.0243 -0.1889    0.3290 -1.2408 -0.0290 
  (-0.08) (-0.02) (-0.28)    (0.58)  (-1.39)  (-0.04)  
CLIENTS, PROD., & BUS. PRAC.  1.3605 1.4094 1.3334    1.5488 0.8933 1.3865 
  (1.82)* (1.12) (1.69)*    (1.95)* (1.08)  (1.87)* 
DISCLOSED BY FIRM ― -0.4756 -0.5370 -0.5479 -0.8856 -0.4281 1.9499 -0.4277 0.1599 -0.6100 
  (-1.03) (-0.68) (-1.09) (-2.13)** (-0.58) (0.85) (-0.88)  (0.32)  (-1.25)  
LOSS ANNOUNCED ― 1.2339 1.2502 1.3345 1.2647 2.0435 1.2058 0.6956 1.4739 1.2193 
  (2.06)** (1.15) (2.15)** (1.69)* (2.43)** (1.11) (1.10)  (2.31)** (2.01)** 
Control Variables:           
NUMBER OF ANALYSTS  0.1393 0.1364 0.1308 -0.0740 0.2772 -0.0977 0.0967 0.1826 0.1233 
  (1.94)* (1.02) (1.87)* (-1.35) (2.71)*** (-0.31) (1.31)  (2.38)** (1.82)* 
FIRM SIZE  -1.5782 -1.5623 -1.5613 -0.1800 -2.4363 0.3794 -1.3672 -1.8424 -1.5343 
  (-4.32)*** (-2.10)** (-4.39)*** (-0.62) (-4.74)*** (0.35) (-4.64)*** (-4.38)*** (-4.28)*** 
VOLATILITY  -0.3659 -0.3892 -0.3462 0.0538 0.4431 -1.0798 1.5563 -0.1873 -0.3276 
  (-1.37) (-0.90) (-0.84) (0.17) (0.75) (-0.75) (1.61)  (-0.72)  (-1.19)  
LEVERAGE  -0.7955 -0.6017 -0.9776 2.9241 0.5513 -6.1424 -0.9416 -0.1200 -1.0719 
  (-0.40) (-0.26) (-0.48) (1.47) (0.17) (-1.41) (-0.46)  (-0.07)  (-0.54)  
BETA  3.3125 3.1489 3.4281 -1.6574 2.0706 7.0813 1.3647 3.5712 3.3367 
  (3.14)*** (1.55) (3.02)*** (-1.64) (1.50) (1.01) (1.11)  (3.32)*** (3.21)*** 
(Δ) PRICE  -0.0078 0.0101 -0.0094 -0.0276 0.0019 -0.0911 -0.0213 -0.0050 -0.0076 
  (-0.16) (0.26) (-0.16) (-1.43) (0.02) (-0.65) (-0.43)  (-0.1)  (-0.16)  
(Δ) VOLUME  1.8413 2.4429 1.9667 1.8397 2.8188 -1.9428 1.6666 1.8735 1.8303 
  (2.59)*** (2.55)** (2.60)*** (4.18)*** (2.52)** (-1.42) (2.33)** (2.43)** (2.57)*** 
DECIMAL  2.5379 2.4654 2.5494 -0.2760 5.5665 -2.0096 30.4391 2.6060 2.4589 
  (3.23)*** (1.65) (3.17)*** (-0.46) (3.84)*** (-0.39) (22.12)*** (3.2)*** (3.05)*** 
BANKS  0.5328 0.5373 0.7189 0.6342 1.2694 2.2277 0.6667 1.0953 0.4277 
  (0.76) (0.47) (0.89) (1.23) (1.15) (2.52)** (0.74)  (1.53)  (0.62)  
INSURERS  1.5359 1.4025 1.5849 5.0655 1.1109 2.9351 0.5194 2.0571 1.5462 
  (1.38) (1.03) (1.37) (3.62)*** (0.59) (0.43) (0.44)  (1.98)** (1.39)  
Constant  13.7076 13.5552 13.4720 6.8448 19.4936 -14.6852 -28.2306 14.0954 13.1202 
  (3.83)*** (2.31)** (3.70)*** (1.75)* (4.03)*** (-1.10) (-4.15)*** (3.72)*** (3.82)*** 
Number of observations  1,316 188 1,260 364 777 175 1,316 1,190 1,316 
F-stat. all variables  3.34 1.49 3.28 3.70 3.39 10.15 82.04 3.56 3.32 
[Prob > F]  [0.000]*** [0.092]* [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
F-stat. govern. & risk mangmt  3.65 1.22 3.52 1.05 3.91 2.04 4.93 3.83 3.66 
[Prob > F]  [0.003]*** [0.300] [0.004]*** [0.391] [0.002]*** [0.076]** [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** 
F-stat. announcement charact.  3.13 1.38 3.28 2.73 3.05 0.69 2.35 4.02 3.11 
[Prob > F]  [0.008]*** [0.236] [0.006]*** [0.067]* [0.048]** [0.501] [0.039]** [0.001]*** [0.009]*** 
R2  0.0821 0.1931 0.0828 0.2531 0.1083 0.2150 0.1417 0.0925 0.0827 
AIC  9,573.49 1,211.21 9,220.57 2,061.73 5,942.22 1,134.48 9,511.25 8,688.68 9,572.62 
BIC  9,682.32 1,279.17 9,328.48 2,131.87 6,026.01 1,191.45 9,687.45 8,795.40 9,681.45 
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Panel B: Change in price impact of trade around settlement announcements 
 
  Model 0 RC1 RC2 RC3 RC4 RC5 RC6 RC7 RC8 
Variable Exp. Table 5: Cross- Pre- Events: Events: Events: Incl. Year Excl. Earn. RM 
 Sign Model (8) Section Crisis Fraud CPBP Other Fixed Eff. Ann. Score 
Governance & Risk Mangmt:           
BOARD INDEPENDENCE  0.0079 0.0072 0.0077 0.2085 0.0228 -0.3189 -0.0112 -0.0024 0.0051 
  (0.51) (0.20) (0.47) (2.99)*** (1.48) (-3.43)*** (-0.55) (-0.15) (0.32) 
INSIDER OWNERSHIP  0.0752 0.0751 0.0857 0.1633 0.0961 -2.2194 0.0881 0.0753 0.0731 
  (2.00)** (0.74) (2.12)** (2.05)** (2.86)*** (-3.71)*** (2.40)** (1.99)** (1.94)* 
BLOCK OWNERSHIP  0.0838 0.0831 0.0927 0.0918 0.0435 0.0124 0.0771 0.0895 0.0832 
  (2.88)*** (1.26) (2.97)*** (1.61) (1.86)* (0.08) (2.59)*** (2.92)*** (2.87)*** 
GINDEX ― 0.2528 0.2516 0.2589 1.4757 -0.1001 2.0428 0.2334 0.3085 0.2329 
  (2.79)*** (1.16) (2.79)*** (3.98)*** (-1.61) (3.94)*** (2.72)*** (3.01)*** (2.63)*** 
RISK MANAGEMENT SCORE  0.3956 0.3958 0.3313 0.5518 0.3230 1.9533 0.2576 0.4430 0.5798 
  (3.19)*** (1.41) (2.32)** (2.04)** (2.46)** (2.73)*** (2.21)** (3.21)*** (3.14)*** 
Announcement Characteristics:           
INTERNAL FRAUD  -0.5769 -0.5918 -0.8365    -0.6683 -0.3583 -0.5189 
  (-0.46) (-0.18) (-0.60)    (-0.53) (-0.27) (-0.41) 
EXTERNAL FRAUD ― 1.6934 1.6854 2.2196    0.5613 1.6814 1.7975 
  (1.96)** (0.75) (2.40)**    (0.61) (1.88)* (2.06)** 
CLIENTS, PROD., & BUS. PRAC.  2.7015 2.6876 2.6802    2.6653 3.0022 2.8056 
  (2.95)*** (1.15) (2.64)***    (2.82)*** (3.11)*** (3.02)*** 
DISCLOSED BY FIRM  -0.8801 -0.8865 -0.8858 -5.2057 0.6166 -3.0098 -0.7033 -1.0020 -0.8594 
  (-2.02)** (-0.97) (-1.80)* (-4.55)*** (1.43) (-2.15)** (-1.94)* (-2.10)** (-1.98)** 
LOSS ANNOUNCED  -0.4558 -0.4681 -0.5327 -9.9240 1.3557 ― -1.2371 -0.6077 -0.4251 
  (-0.61) (-0.27) (-0.56) (-4.22)*** (1.45) ― (-1.56) (-0.78) (-0.58) 
Control Variables:           
NUMBER OF ANALYSTS  -0.0895 -0.0898 -0.1142 0.1185 -0.0728 -1.0889 -0.0695 -0.0722 -0.0864 
  (-2.02)** (-0.88) (-2.21)** (0.75) (-1.59) (-4.24)*** (-1.60) (-1.65)* (-1.94)* 
FIRM SIZE  0.5356 0.5392 0.5841 3.4865 0.1157 -1.3046 0.4715 0.5586 0.5455 
  (2.24)** (0.96) (2.37)** (2.95)*** (0.77) (-0.94) (2.15)** (2.24)** (2.28)** 
VOLATILITY  -0.2236 -0.2168 -0.6855 2.4498 -0.3557 -3.8670 -0.5735 -0.3010 -0.1685 
  (-1.60) (-0.65) (-1.80)* (4.35)*** (-2.96)*** (-2.96)*** (-2.31)** (-2.08)** (-1.22) 
LEVERAGE  -5.0631 -5.0260 -4.9276 12.7854 -2.5421 -40.5904 -6.0236 -5.0516 -5.0531 
  (-3.71)*** (-1.62) (-3.39)*** (3.22)*** (-1.98)** (-4.30)*** (-4.23)*** (-3.63)*** (-3.70)*** 
BETA  0.0318 0.0218 -0.5694 -16.6076 0.4141 -0.1587 0.4249 0.1311 0.0022 
  (0.05) (0.02) (-0.69) (-4.42)*** (0.59) (-0.02) (0.59) (0.21) (0.00) 
(Δ) PRICE  -0.0363 -0.0300 -0.0381 -0.0610 0.0369 -0.3600 -0.0290 -0.0371 -0.0368 
  (-1.29) (-0.54) (-0.81) (-1.31) (1.09) (-2.65)*** (-1.04) (-1.25) (-1.31) 
(Δ) VOLUME  0.3573 0.5426 0.2600 3.7139 0.6061 -8.7102 0.4957 0.3481 0.3660 
  (0.62) (0.29) (0.38) (2.82)*** (1.13) (-3.67)*** (0.87) (0.59) (0.64) 
DECIMAL  -2.8351 -2.8375 -3.2308 -10.2268 -1.2308 -5.6823 1.5308 -2.8822 -2.8518 
  (-4.41)*** (-1.90)* (-4.02)*** (-4.17)*** (-2.38)** (-2.89)*** (1.41) (-4.28)*** (-4.45)*** 
BANKS  1.9993 1.9827 1.8842 -1.7467 2.0699 -0.0915 1.8822 2.2613 1.8482 
  (3.21)*** (1.36) (2.58)*** (-0.81) (3.48)*** (-0.03) (2.97)*** (3.43)*** (3.03)*** 
INSURERS  1.1482 1.1519 0.8531 9.9168 0.6421 -8.7115 0.9637 1.4387 1.1848 
  (2.03)** (0.99) (1.32) (2.93)*** (1.17) (-1.79)* (1.54) (2.41)** (2.10)** 
Constant  -7.2450 -7.1872 -5.5652 -48.5027 -2.1456 73.8827 -5.6262 -7.7493 -8.0583 
  (-2.35)** (-1.07) (-1.43) (-2.94)*** (-0.98) (3.24)*** (-1.79)* (-2.45)** (-2.67)*** 
Number of observations  2,014 288 1,734 378 1,405 231 2,014 1,937 2,014 
F-stat. all variables  2.99 0.92 2.78 2.63 2.85 2.30 2.45 2.75 2.99 
[Prob > F]  [0.000]*** [0.567] [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.004]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
F-stat. govern. & risk mangmt  4.05 0.70 3.95 4.39 3.71 4.63 4.18 4.00 4.05 
[Prob > F]  [0.001]*** [0.623] [0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
F-stat. announcement charact.  3.55 0.68 3.37 12.68 1.88 4.60 3.97 3.38 3.69 
[Prob > F]  [0.003]*** [0.636] [0.005]*** [0.000]*** [0.153] [0.033]** [0.001]*** [0.005]*** [0.003]*** 
R2  0.0505 0.0725 0.0534 0.3754 0.0457 0.4054 0.1002 0.0533 0.0510 
AIC  14,766.67 2,033.87 12,967.00 2,809.00 9,687.89 1,793.10 14,684.56 14,261.40 14,765.58 
BIC  14,884.44 2,110.79 13,081.62 2,879.83 9,782.35 1,851.62 14,875.23 14,378.35 14,883.35 
Note:  For RC5, LOSS ANNOUNCED took the value of 1 for all events and was therefore dropped from the estimation due to lack of 
variability in the variable. 
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Table 10: Simultaneous Determination of Liquidity and Information Asymmetry  
This table presents the results of the simultaneous equations model for the determinants of liquidity and information 
asymmetry around first announcements and settlement announcements of operational risk events. For each of the four 
specifications, the dependent variable is the change in daily quoted depth in the first equation, and change in a daily measure 
of information asymmetry from the non-event period during the event window t = [-3,+3]. The two measures of information 
asymmetry are effective spread (ΔES) and price impact of trade (30 min) (ΔPIT). t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Superscripts ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
  First Announcements  Settlement Announcements 
  Δ INFORMATION Δ INFORMATION  Δ INFORMATION Δ INFORMATION 
Variable  ASYMMETRY= ΔES ASYMMETRY= ΔPIT  ASYMMETRY= ΔES ASYMMETRY= ΔPIT 
 Exp. (1) (2) (3) (4) Exp.  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Sign ΔDEPTH ΔES ΔDEPTH ΔPIT Sign ΔDEPTH ΔES ΔDEPTH ΔPIT 
∆ INFORMATION ASYMMETRY ― -0.0091  0.0012  ― -0.0180  -0.0022  
  (-2.07)**  (1.08)   (-4.74)***  (-2.71)***  
Δ QUOTED DEPTH ―  -0.4144  0.9937 ―  -0.6464  -1.8718 
   (-2.40)**  (1.45)   (-4.92)***  (-3.03)*** 
Governance and Risk Management:           
BOARD INDEPENDENCE  0.0012 -0.0226 0.0015 -0.0354  0.0003 0.0055 0.0003 0.0091 
  (1.22) (-3.65)*** (1.47) (-1.44)  (0.44) (1.22) (0.36) (0.43) 
INSIDER OWNERSHIP  -0.0006 -0.0246 -0.0003 -0.0935  -0.0027 0.0299 -0.0031 0.0682 
  (-0.29) (-1.82)* (-0.15) (-1.74)*  (-2.47)** (4.66)*** (-2.85)*** (2.26)** 
BLOCK OWNERSHIP  -0.0021 -0.0246 -0.0019 -0.0350  -0.0030 0.0136 -0.0030 0.0786 
  (-1.64) (-3.03)*** (-1.45) (-1.09)  (-3.11)*** (2.42)** (-3.19)*** (2.99)*** 
GINDEX  -0.0001 0.0397 -0.0004 -0.1028  0.0103 0.0001 0.0110 0.2720 
  (-0.01) (1.35) (-0.07) (-0.88)  (2.82)*** (0) (3.01)*** (2.68)*** 
RISK MANAGEMENT SCORE  -0.0240 0.0486 -0.0246 0.3174  0.0068 -0.0301 0.0083 0.4203 
  (-3.26)*** (1.10) (-3.34)*** (1.81)*  (1.21) (-0.95) (1.47) (2.83)*** 
Announcement Characteristics:           
DISCLOSED BY FIRM  0.1536 0.1465 0.1527 -0.3819  -0.0374 0.2120 -0.0433 -0.9277 
  (6.09)*** (0.93) (6.05)*** (-0.61)  (-2.33)** (2.26)** (-2.71)*** (-2.11)** 
LOSS ANNOUNCED  -0.0587 0.3031 -0.0636 1.3290  -0.0113 0.7715 -0.0261 -0.4906 
  (-2.58)*** (2.13)** (-2.80)*** (2.35)**  (-0.21) (2.41)** (-0.48) (-0.33) 
INTERNAL FRAUD  -0.0134 0.3261 -0.0193 1.8768  0.0647 0.4174 0.0570 -0.4403 
  (-0.33) (1.28) (-0.47) (1.85)*  (1.97)** (2.17)** (1.74)* (-0.49) 
EXTERNAL FRAUD  0.0082 0.2905 0.0058 -0.1335  0.0638 0.1866 0.0651 1.8343 
  (0.19) (1.06) (0.13) (-0.12)  (1.64) (0.81) (1.67)* (1.71)* 
CLIENTS, PRODUCTS, & BUS. PRACTICES  0.0377 0.2133 0.0338 1.2768  -0.0116 0.2624 -0.0102 2.6835 
  (1.14) (1.04) (1.03) (1.56)  (-0.46) (1.76)* (-0.4) (3.84)*** 
Control Variables:           
NUMBER OF ANALYSTS  0.0032 0.0124 0.0030 0.1434  0.0002 -0.0020 0.0000 -0.0848 
  (1.28) (0.84) (1.19) (2.43)**  (0.09) (-0.19) (0.01) (-1.77)* 
FIRM SIZE  -0.0059 -0.1551 -0.0019 -1.6287  -0.0215 0.0879 -0.0225 0.5248 
  (-0.45) (-2.36)** (-0.14) (-6.23)***  (-2.33)** (2.09)** (-2.43)** (2.66)*** 
VOLATILITY  -0.0302 -0.0817 -0.0287 -0.3107  0.0224 -0.0409 0.0227 -0.1866 
  (-1.98)** (-0.87) (-1.89)* (-0.83)  (3.47)*** (-1.09) (3.52)*** (-1.06) 
LEVERAGE  0.0033 0.0090 0.0039 -1.4677  0.0610 -0.9546 0.0672 -5.0669 
  (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (-0.72)  (1.09) (-3.03)*** (1.2) (-3.43)*** 
BETA  0.3047 0.2942 0.2980 3.6158  -0.0387 0.0942 -0.0404 -0.0361 
  (6.53)*** (1.00) (6.36)*** (3.09)***  (-1.39) (0.58) (-1.45) (-0.05) 
Δ PRICE   -0.0246  -0.0263   -0.0148  -0.0451 
   (-3.82)***  (-1.03)   (-3.35)***  (-2.17)** 
NUMBER OF SHARES  0.0137  0.0124   0.0431  0.0439  
  (0.84)  (0.77)   (3.55)***  (3.61)***  
Δ VOLUME  0.0699  0.0684   0.0859  0.0831  
  (4.21)***  (4.09)***   (5.74)***  (5.57)***  
DECIMAL  0.1204 0.5261 0.1133 2.6697  -0.0130 -0.0539 -0.0185 -2.7979 
  (3.74)*** (2.71)*** (3.51)*** (3.46)***  (-0.51) (-0.37) (-0.73) (-4.12)*** 
BANKS  0.1037 0.5412 0.0981 0.4580  -0.0149 0.1602 -0.0134 1.9981 
  (2.99)*** (2.50)** (2.83)*** (0.53)  (-0.64) (1.17) (-0.57) (3.11)*** 
INSURERS  0.2317 1.2701 0.2176 1.8156  0.0506 -0.1852 0.0571 1.2063 
  (4.91)*** (4.39)*** (4.64)*** (1.58)  (1.64)* (-1.06) (1.85)* (1.47) 
Constant  -0.7872 1.8009 -0.8128 14.6481  -0.4389 -2.5221 -0.4175 -7.4887 
  (-4.51)*** (2.10)** (-4.64)*** (4.29)***  (-3.04)*** (-3.78)*** (-2.89)*** (-2.39)** 
Number of observations  1,316 1,316 1,316 1,316  2,014 2,014 2,014 2,014 
χ2-statistic  168.37 116.09 166.14 99.08  179.14 90.22 165.06 114.95 
[Prob > χ 2]  [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***  [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
R2  0.1111 0.0786 0.1105 0.0683  0.0733 0.0339 0.0726 0.0507 
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